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Economic theory provides a coherent framework for analysing the elements of growth and 
sustainable development.  Robust policies and appropriate institutional structures are 
essential to achieving sustainable development.  Environmental problems are rooted in 
failed markets and their resolution requires government taking some kind of action – to 
establish property rights, set standards of liability, apply polluter pays taxes, or regulate.  
There is ample evidence showing that market based instruments can achieve the same 
environmental outcome at considerably less cost relative to command and control.  
Rational policy must seriously consider the use of market-based instruments. 
A framework for considering the quality of institutional structures vis-à-vis achieving 
sustainable development is presented.  The framework is applied to aspects of the 
Resource Management Act 1991.  Although the Act aims to promote sustainable 
management it is the primary legal foundation for sustainable development policy.  One 
result of the Act was to devolve a great deal of environmental management and policy to 
local government.  To a limited extent the Act is permissive and creates opportunities for 
local and regional government to find effective and efficient ways of achieving 
environmental outcomes that suit their communities.  There is a clear preference for 
command and control in situations where statute provides a legal framework for market 
based instruments.  But the options for using market-based instruments are limited.  
There are instances where attempts by regional administrators to implement market-
based instruments are thwarted either by statute or by coordination difficulties at higher 
levels of government.  Barriers to using market-based instruments are identified along 
with suggestions for institutional reform. 
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  P28 - Economic Systems, Natural Resources and 
Environment 
Q01 - Sustainable Development 
KEYWORDS  Sustainable development; institutions and decision-making; 
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Institutions and Decision Making for 
Sustainable Development 
1 Introduction 
Sustainable development links the welfare of future generations with the capacity of the 
biosphere to sustain life.  Sustainable development poses particular challenges for public 
policy because it is not a fixed state but rather a process of change in which exploitation 
of resources, the direction of investment, the orientation of technology, and institutional 
change are made consistent with the future as well as present needs. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to focus on the environment/economic interface; 
identify key market-based approaches; identify the level at which market failure should be 
resolved in particular circumstances (ie, centralised vs. decentralised); explore ways to 
incentivise administrators to apply market-based approaches where this can result in 
more efficient environmental outcomes, while also being conducive to economic growth; 
assess the quality of institutional arrangements in New Zealand and areas to focus on for 
improvement; and consider access to resources and the decision-making structure.  It 
also includes consideration of the integration and tradeoffs required between economic 
and environmental objectives. 
Sustainable development has a policy focus because it is about the “design” of policy that 
ensures delivery of a set of quantitative and qualitative outcomes.  The key to sustainable 
development is choosing robust policies.  Institutional arrangements provide a 
fundamental link between public policy, commercial organisations that use (directly or 
indirectly) environmental resources and public organisations that are responsible for 
administering environmental policy (Sharp, 1996a).  Many of the reforms introduced in the 
1980s early 1990s fall within Williamson’s (1991) notion of primary reforms.   For example, 
the introduction of tradable fishing rights was a primary reform that led to the formation of 
markets to solve the problem of allocating a sustainable harvest and unleashed incentives 
to form new businesses, invest in stock enhancement, and so on (Batstone and Sharp, 
1999). 
Frameworks whereby sustainability can be evaluated and measured are a crucial input.  
Environmental problems are rooted in failed markets.  Their resolution requires 
government taking some kind of action – to establish property rights, set standards of 
liability, apply polluter pays taxes, or regulate.  The economic literature on market failure is 
well known and economic instruments have received rigorous analysis over the years.  
Many externalities arise from a poor definition of property rights.  For example, well-
designed systems of property rights effectively manage externalities associated with water  




use.  It goes without saying that efficiency can also be enhanced by greater reliance on 
rights-based systems of management (Scott, 1996).  Thus, rights-based instruments offer 
gains to both economy and environment.  Of course, rights-based management may not 
be best suited to all environmental “problems”.  Water pollution might be better 
approached by using the “polluter pays” principle endorsed by the OECD decades ago 
(OECD, 2001). 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), along with accumulated legal decisions, 
provides the legal structure underpinning environmental management and policy in New 
Zealand.  The overriding purpose of the Act is to promote sustainable management.  
Sections within the Act viz Section 32 were inserted to provide a degree of discipline – 
use of an appropriate cost-benefit analysis - in the formation and implementation of 
environmental policy.  One result of the RMA was to devolve a great deal of 
environmental management and policy to local government (Sharp, 1997).   The Act is 
permissive and created opportunities for local and regional government to find effective 
and efficient ways of achieving environmental standards that suited their communities.  
Policies of national significance can be “called in” and considered at the national level. 
In New Zealand today, many environmental policies are based on a regulatory response 
without consideration first being given to the full range of options available.  On this 
surface the prevailing preference for regulatory interventions is contrary to the intent of 
Section 32.  In some cases regulation may be warranted, but it should be the result of 
careful analysis and evaluation of alternative options.  Non-regulatory approaches, 
especially market-based approaches, can produce better environmental outcomes while 
also being conducive to economic growth.  Why is this not occurring?  
This paper emphasises the operation of existing institutional arrangements and systems 
of decision-making as they relate to the environment-economy interface.   It includes 
consideration of the integration and tradeoffs required between economic and 
environmental objectives.   
Five sections follow the introduction to this report. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
economic foundations for designing policies to enhance sustainable development. Section 
3 moves from the standard economic treatment of externalities to discuss their 
incorporation into institutional arrangement and decision-making structures. Section 4 
provides a generic framework for assessing the quality of institutional arrangements and 
decision-making structures. Section 5 applies the framework to a limited number of issues 
in New Zealand, highlights the progress made towards implementing policies to achieve 
sustainable development and identifies deficiencies in the current set of institutional 
arrangements. Section 6 provides conclusions and suggestions for reform.  




2  Policies to enhance sustainable 
development 
If we adopt the Bruntland definition of sustainable development, then policy should focus 
on the meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987:43).  Atkinson (2000) lists three key 
points of sustainable development as follows: 
1.  concern for future generations is the defining feature of sustainable development 
and to correct for the myopia of earlier policies, contemporary policy should be 
more forward looking 
2.  increased attention to economy-environment linkages 
3.  requirement to examine trade-offs between sustainable development and other 
goals 
As noted earlier, environmental problems are rooted in market failure and their resolution 
usually requires government taking action.  While correcting for market failures might be 
seen as a necessary condition for achieving sustainable outcomes it may not be sufficient.  
Additional challenges arise from the call to address poverty and the welfare of future 
generations.  This section focuses on a range of broad approaches to environmental 
issues and their contribution to sustainable development.  Although each instrument is 
discussed in isolation, a combination of instruments might best apply to the situation at 
hand.  For example, tradable water rights can easily operate within a minimum flow 
constraint aimed at protecting conservation interests. 
Two broad classes of market failure are relevant to sustainable development policy.  
Negative (pollution type) externalities attract most attention in the literature (OECD, 2001).  
As noted in Sharp, (2001) residuals are an inevitable fact of production and consumption.  
For example, a firm producing paper – a product that is valued in the market – may also 
produce waste that is discharged into a river adversely affecting other users and non-
users of the river environment.  A dairy farm relying heavily on fertilizers to lift production 
might contribute to groundwater pollution and possibly accelerate the eutrophication of a 
lake.  The by-products of household consumption – solid waste, sewerage – also enter 
the environment.  Vehicular transportation, of all kinds, contributes to environmental 
pollution.  Urban development can enhance sedimentation and contribute to the 
destruction of waterways and wildlife habitat. 
The Hartwick (1990) model reminds us that achieving sustainable development involves 
pricing the natural environment’s services in general.  In particular resource pricing should 
account for contemporaneous and intertemporal externalities.  For example, uncontrolled 
access to fish stocks eventually leads to stock depletion, over-investment in harvesting 
capacity and inefficient outcomes.  Competition for a common pool resource (eg gas field) 
will result in a lower economic dividend relative to a situation where access is priced so as 
to maximise net present value (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979).  Of course, it is desirable that 
the optimal price of depleting a stock resource includes the cost of the externalities 
associated with extraction. 
The above externalities are not an economic issue in a world with no scarcity.  In a world 
of scarcity and in the absence of appropriate environmental policies, externalities create 
opportunity costs that distort the principal mechanism that we rely upon to allocate 
resources within the economy.  The efficiency properties of the competitive market  




mechanism have been long established and need not be discussed in any detail 
(Nicholson, 2000). 
It is also well known that an efficient outcome, in the presence of externalities, can be 
achieved by pricing the externality at its marginal (social) damage (Field and Field, 2002).  
This is the standard Pigouvian result that provides a framework for assessing the relative 
efficiency of alternative policy instruments.
1
 
The call to use market-based instruments (MBIs) to achieve sustainable development is 
not without critics.  Some will argue against valuing adverse environmental impacts.  
However, the concept of total economic value is recognised as an important part of the 
environmental economist’s tool kit when it comes to the practical implementation of MBIs 
(Sharp.  2001).  Others will not be prepared to accept environmental degradation of any 
kind and the very idea of balancing the costs and benefits of pollution abatement is an 
anathema.  The reluctance to accept trade-offs is implicit in the definition of strong 
sustainability.  Critics may also object to the idea of tradable rights to the environment 
without fully appreciating the fact that property rights are associated with current 
regulations. 
This section provides an overview of economic instruments to achieve sustainable 
development.
2
  The range instruments is generous and includes traditional command and 
control (CAC), polluter-pays schemes, tradable rights, and mechanisms aimed at tapping 
into the preferences of individuals and the community.  The economic underpinnings of 
the alternatives are described and discussed in terms of economic efficiency.  The 
economic models provide a basis for the design of specific institutional arrangements as 
outlined in Section 3. 
2.1 Economic  efficiency 
Why should society be concerned about externalities? In the New Zealand economy, the 
market is the principal mechanism that we use to guide production and consumption 
decisions.  If the market is working “well” then all goods and services are priced at 
marginal cost and it would not be possible to improve the welfare of one individual without 
reducing the welfare of another individual.  This outcome is Pareto efficient.  Externalities 
drive a wedge between price and cost.  To pick up on the above example involving 
pollution from the paper industry, in the absence of intervention the price of paper will not 
equal the full cost of production because the opportunity cost of lower water quality (as 
measured by the community’s welfare loss) is not included alongside the cost of labour, 
capital and other inputs used in the manufacture of paper products.  If the externality is 
significant, then it would be possible for those that gained from an improvement in water 
quality to potentially compensate polluters for incurring higher treatment costs and be 
better off.  This is described as a potential Pareto improvement. 
Economic efficiency is illustrated in Figure 1 using a simple “upstream polluter 
downstream community” model.  The polluter derives marginal benefits (MB) from being 
able to use the river as a sink for waste; the community faces damages (MD) associated 
with the waste.  Assuming that all costs and benefits are expressed in the dollar metric, 
the efficient level of pollution is Q* where MB = MD.  There are a number of points that 
                                                                 
1 The standard result depends on a number of assumptions viz convex production possibilities, well-defined property rights, (typically 
zero) transaction costs, and competitive markets.   
2 Those interested in more technical treatments should consider reading Stavins (2000) and Bromley (1995).  




should be noted about this equilibrium.  Time is not a factor in the model and would need 
to be explicitly considered given the intertemporal focus of sustainable development.  
Hartwick (1990) shows how adjustments would have to be made to the model if the 
pollutants accumulated over time. 











The equilibrium is determined by a balancing of costs and benefits at the margin.  The 
shape and position of MD and MB is an empirical issue.  It should be noted that 
techniques are available to estimate MD (Freeman, 1993).  It is assumed that both 
functions can be expressed in the dollar metric.  Industry’s MB function can be thought of 
as profit or the difference between revenue and (private) costs valued at competitive 
market prices.  Use of the river’s assimilative capacity is not explicitly priced because it is 
not traded in the market.  The opportunity cost (price) of the discharge is the impact it has 
on the welfare of the community down stream as measured by MD. 
The price generating mechanisms embedded in Figure 1 are significant.  Clearly, firms 
seeking to maximise profit will respond to market prices and in the absence of a price on 
pollution the equilibrium will be at B where marginal profit is zero.  At B, MD > MB and the 
community could potentially compensate the polluting industry and both would be better 
off at a lower level of pollution.  The efficient level of pollution Q* is where MD = MB. 
In a nutshell, the policy problem is that there is no mechanism (eg, polluter pays charge, 
price of a tradable right) signalling the cost of pollution so that the adverse impacts are 
internalised into the polluting industry’s decision-making calculus.  The policy instrument 
for signalling MD is an object of choice within the context of environmental policy. 
Many environmental services are characterised by a degree of publicness.  For example, 
the services provided by the earth’s atmosphere, and the attributes of endangered 
species, are close to the definition of a pure public good.   Since a public good is non-
exclusive, the price people are willing to pay for a given quantity is the sum of each 
individual’s willingness to pay.  Two attributes of a public good are emphasised viz 
nonexclusivity and nonrivalry.  A pure public good is characterised by: 
nonexclusivity, where no one can be excluded from enjoying the benefits; and 
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nonrivalry, where additional consumers may use the service at no additional cost.   
Application of the “private good” “public good” dichotomy to problems associated with 
sustainable development has limited usefulness.  For example, Nicholson (2000) defines 
fishing grounds and public grazing land as being non-exclusive yet consumption being 
rival.  Better defining property rights can often solve the problem of non-exclusivity.  
Nonrival goods that permit imposition of an exclusion mechanism are referred to as club 
goods.  Technology will continue to lower the relative cost of excluding those not entitled 
to consume the services available. 
In the meantime let us assume that environmental services are public goods and cannot 
be efficiently traded in competitive markets.  The efficient quantity of a public good is 
determined by balancing the sum total of individual willingness to pay with the marginal 
cost of service supply.  If water quality is a public good, then MD in Figure 1 represents 
the community’s willingness to pay for cleaner water and MB measures the opportunity 
cost (foregone profit) of cleaner water.  The efficient level of clean water (or pollution level) 
can, in principle, be described.  But in practice how might this equilibrium be achieved? 
With public goods the underlying problem is to get members of the community to 
“truthfully” reveal their willingness to pay (WTP).  Returning to Figure 1, it is possible to 
show that Q* is a Lindahl equilibrium where the tax share of each individual, is correctly 
assessed at the marginal value to each person (ie, each person’s share is WTPi ) and 
precisely pays to the cost.  Thus, if ex ante pollution was OB then the total tax bill is P(B-
Q*) and this would be shared across the community in proportion to each person’s 
willingness to pay.  Although the equilibrium is efficient – tax shares mimicking the 
competitive pricing mechanism – it is not very realistic because of the free rider problem.  
The Lindahl solution requires knowledge of the optimal tax share for each person.  Since 
no one can be excluded then it is possible for individuals to free ride on the supply of 
clean water.  Voting might deliver an optimal outcome but in general a degree of 
compulsion is required to solve the free-rider problem. 
2.2 Regulation 
The use of regulatory mechanisms is very common in environmental policy.  For example, 
legislation or a rule might specify the maximum amount of SO2 that a factory can emit over 
a given period of time.  In Figure 1 we represent aggregate pollution as QR.  The 
regulation is not efficient because MB > MD.  Information on marginal costs is necessary 
to setting an efficient regulation. 
Regulations can be expressed in many ways.  For example, a regional rule might require 
the use of “best available technology” (BAT) coupled with an emissions reduction target.  
Figure 2 shows the status quo level of emissions reduction is ES.  Let us assume that the 
rule requires a BAT such that ER is achieved.  There are many ways to control pollution 
and we should be concerned that the least cost available technology (LCAT) a term that 
also includes technique and management.  If LCAT is not used then X-inefficiency 
(labelled a) exists and the industry is paying a higher cost than necessary per unit of 
emission reduction.
3
 Relative to the efficient level of pollution reduction, there are two 
costs: unnecessary costs associated with the use of BAT  and the cost (b) of not 
specifying the optimum (E*) correctly (Pearce, 2000). 
                                                                 
3 The term X-inefficiency is derived from Leibenstein (1966).  

















Many governments throughout Asia have opted for CAC over the use of MBIs.  Weak 
enforcement and widespread exemptions have resulted in declining environmental quality 
(Markandya, 1998).  The ratio of proposed cost to least cost reductions in air pollution 
emissions (particulates and SO2) is 10 for the People’s Republic of China and 3 for India.  
In the case of achieving water quality targets in the People’s Republic of China (reducing 
total suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand and biological oxygen demand) annual 
cost savings of 70 % are achieved relative to regulation.  Table 1 provides more evidence 
on the ratio of CAC to least cost.  The studies are somewhat dated but nevertheless 
illustrate the potential magnitude of losses to the economy.  For example, a ratio of 6:1 
tells us that the total cost of a CAC regulation is six times more expensive than the least 
cost approach.  This suggests that resources allocated to pollution abatement could be 
released for use elsewhere in the economy. 
The cost of pollution regulation is often difficult to determine.  McClelland and Horowitz 
(1999) estimate the marginal cost of pollution abatement for pulp and paper plants in the 
US.  Pulp and paper is the largest water polluting industry.  Actual emissions of 
biochemical oxygen demand were found to be about 50% of the amount allowed under 
the Clean Water Act.  Why industry incurs the additional costs is not known, although 
uncertainty and non-smoothness in production are likely causes.  Industry attributes the 
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Table 1 - Costs of command and control relative to least cost 
Study and Year  Pollutants  CAC 
Benchmark 
Ratio 
CAC to least cost 
Atkinson and Lewis (1974)  Particulates  State plan    6.00 
Roach et al (1981)  SO2 State  plan    4.25 
Hahn and Noll (1982)  Sulphates  State plan    1.07 
Krupnick (1983)  NO2  Standard    5.96 
Seskin et al (1983)  NO2 Standard    14.40 
McGartland (1984)  Particulates  State plan   4.18 
Spofford (1984)  SO2 
Particulates 
Uniform % reduction 
Uniform % reduction 
 1.78 
 22.0 
Maloney and Yandle (1984)  Hydrocarbons  Uniform % reduction    4.15 
Source: Tietenberg 1996 
2.3  Market based instruments 
Two policy instruments are suggested in Figure 1.  Price or quantity can be used to 
achieve the same result.  With perfect information and certainty about the relevant MB 
and MD functions, a regulatory agency can auction off rights to Q* and obtains P* or set a 
price P* with the result Q* - the outcome is the same.  One important difference is the 
revenue effect.  With a tax, revenues go to government whereas with quotas, either 
government could auction them off and get revenue equal to the capitalised value of the 
tax or government could grandfather them and not enjoy any revenues. 
2.3.1 Polluter  pays 
The polluter pays principle, endorsed by OECD in 1972, is a direct descendent of the 
Pigouvian tax scheme used to establish efficiency within the context of competitive 
equilibrium.  Figure 1 shows how polluter pays would work.  Industry’s profit maximising 
equilibrium is B.  If a fictional environmental agency were to price use of the river 
according to the MD schedule then efficiency would result.  The agency would only have 
to set a charge of P
* to achieve the efficient outcome Q*. 
Setting political considerations aside, knowledge of marginal damages is one of the more 
significant barriers to achieving efficiency.  Recognising this difficulty resulted in an 
alternative approach that seeks to minimise the cost of meeting a standard.  Returning to 
Figure 1, a standard set by the agency is shown as QR units of pollution.   If the agency 
set a charge of PR per unit of pollution then the environmental outcome QR would result.  
Two points should be emphasised.  First, it would be highly unlikely that the agency has 
the information needed to set the efficient target (Q*).  Second, whether or not the target 
is met depends on the charge – if too high (P > PR) then target will be exceeded, if too low 
(P < PR) the outcome will not meet the target.  The flexibility required to perfectly achieve 
the target may be difficult to achieve because proposed changes would be decided in the 
political market. 
Economists favour the polluter pays approach, relative to regulation, because it tends to 
produce the desired result at lowest cost to society and provides an on-going incentive to 
implement less polluting technology.  Rather than trying to achieve economic efficiency 
the aim is reduced to achieving the desired outcome at least cost to the economy.  Figure  









o e e 2e + = .  Let us 
assume that the agency wants to reduce emissions to 2e
*.  Requiring each firm to emit e
* 
will achieve the desired target.  This is not a cost-minimising level because the marginal 
costs of reducing emissions are not equal MC1 (e*) >MC2 (e*).  A charge of t* will provide 
the necessary opportunity cost to each firm.  If firm i pollutes then it pays t*, the alternative 








* e e e 2 MC MC   t + = = = and .   The information needed to achieve this 
result is considerably less that the Pigouvian ideal.  The agency need only specify the 
target 2e* and set the charge.  There is no need to know each firm’s marginal abatement 
costs.  The agency must of course monitor and measure discharges but there is no a 
priori reason why this must result in a net cost to the agency over and above the CAC 
alternative. 










A charge levied on polluters for use of the environment provides an incentive to change 
behaviour in ways that can promote sustainable development.  According to the OECD 
evidence of their effectiveness is given by the higher responsiveness of energy demand to 
changes in energy prices in the longer than in the shorter run (OECD, 2001).  For 
example, fuel taxes differentiated according to environmental criteria on gasoline (leaded 
and unleaded) and diesel fuels (ordinary and ultra-low sulphur) have led to a reduction in 
the use of the most-polluting fuels. 
The difficulty of measuring and monitoring externalities has limited the wider application of 
environmental taxes.  Ideally, taxes based on emissions should reflect differences in 
environmental impacts.  Most taxes are levied on the products associated with pollution 
rather than the environmental impact of pollution.  Two diesel vehicles could consume the 
same amount of fuel – and therefore pay the same charge - but one generates less 
pollution.  In some cases fuel characteristics (eg, sulphur, lead content) may be a 
reasonably good proxy for the externality. 
The idea proposed in Figure 1 shows the tax being directly associated with the level of 
pollution from the industry.  In a real-world situation, the production of externalities arise 
from particular technologies and behaviour.  The environmental tax base can be defined 
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Regardless of whether it is defined on an input (eg, diesel) or an output (eg, sulphur) it is 
highly likely that the tax is imperfectly correlated with the level of emissions that we want 
to control.  In some cases we can measure and monitor emissions and the best (efficient) 
solution is to tax emissions provided, of course, the causal relationship with damages is 
known. 
Charges create an element of certainty in prices of the externality but the behavioural 
response depends on price elasticity of demand and income.  For example, in New 
Zealand the short-run price elasticity of petrol is –0.11 and short-run income elasticity is 
0.57 (Hughes, 1980).  Although dated, these results tell us that demand is relatively price 
inelastic and petrol is a normal good.  In general, a “problem” with multiple dimensions 
requires use of a combination of taxes.  For example, externalities associated with traffic 
congestion might be more efficiently dealt with using a combination of congestion pricing 
and environmental taxes. 
Figure 4 shows that transportation fuels and vehicle related charges provide the largest 
tax base within the OECD.  Thus it would appear that polluter pays has a limited range of 
use, especially if one considers the possibility that governments may be targeting the tax 
base simply for revenue raising and not necessarily for improving environmental quality.  
Environmental taxes per capita are highest in Europe (eg, Denmark, Norway US$1,200-
1,400) and relatively low in the USA and NZ (US$250).   
Choice of the correct tax base is sometimes difficult.  For example, consider choosing to 
levy a tax on diesel.  The impact of the tax on environmental quality will depend on the 
interaction of many variables that are exogenous to the use of diesel, such as climate, 
neighbourhood and time of day and, the age of the vehicle, its maintenance and driving 
behaviour. 
Conceptually, each variable could act to determine the environmental impact of diesel 
use.  A tax on diesel will imperfectly discriminate among different vehicles and drivers.  It 
is not necessarily true that there will be a trade-off between efficiency and equity.  
Suppose that a diesel tax leads to efficiency gains by bringing marginal costs and 
marginal benefits closer together.  There is no reason why the tax should increase 
inequality – this is an empirical issue. 
Most stylised versions of taxation show externalities being corrected independently of the 
effects on the distribution of welfare in the economy.  The reason is that this version 
assumes government makes lump sum transfers to redistribute income and welfare.  As 
Sandmo (2000) points out, the use of taxes is to correct for an externality – one target, 
one instrument.  The difficulty associated with the distribution of welfare is that 
government does not have the information to individualise lump-sum payments.  




Figure 4 - Revenues raised from environmentally related tax-bases  












Source OECD 2002 
There are, at least, two aspects to the distributional issues associated with environmental 
policy.  To illustrate, consider imposing a tax on diesel and assume that the waste 
associated with diesel combustion impacts both air and water quality.  First, it is quite 
conceivable that the distributional impact of an increase in air quality will differ from the 
impact of an increase in water quality.  Second, a tax on diesel will have distributional 
effects that depend on the income elasticity of diesel (impact on households) and the 
ability of producers (impact on business) to pass the tax on.   
A double dividend has been attributed to environmental taxes.  The idea behind a double 
dividend is that if we implement more environmental taxes then other taxes can be cut 
and this can lead to other non-environmental gains.  The underlying assumption is that 
government revenue stays the same.  Economic theory does not give unqualified support 
to the view that both dividends will be positive.  Although this is likely to be the case for 
the environmental dividend but there is no general case for the tax revenue dividend to be 
positive.  To say anything with confidence requires further assumptions about the initial 
state of the tax system and the demand interrelationships among goods and services. 
2.3.2 Tradable  rights 
An alternative approach to addressing market failure is to establish a set of property rights 
that enable markets to develop.  The approach is a direct attempt at correcting ill-defined 
property rights.  Once again, we can use Figure 1 to illustrate the idea.  Assume that the 
environmental agency establishes rights to discharge X = OB units of pollution over a 
given period of time.  Firms must hold a right in order to use the environment’s 
assimilative capacity.  Rights are assumed to be tradable.  From the point of view of 
economic efficiency it does not matter who gets the initial entitlement of rights, provided 
they are tradable.  Thus, the community (C) could initially hold all the rights XC = OB and 
industry have no rights XI = O.  Moving from OB, the community would be willing to face 
pollution to the point where it received compensation equal to MD, industry of course 
would not pay more than the addition to profit it enjoyed as a result of being able to 
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right would be P*.  A similar result holds if industry initially held all the rights XI = OB.  This 
result is attributed to Coase (1960). 
2.3.3 Water  pollution 
Transferable discharge permits (TDPs) were first applied as an instrument to manage 
water pollution in 1981.  The assimilative capacity of the Fox River (Wisconsin) was 
inadequate to maintain water quality standards even when point source discharges 
satisfied federal standards.  Additional proportionate reductions were introduced to meet 
water standards.  The TDP system came into operation once this initial allocation of daily 
pollution was set.  In order to achieve a least-cost outcome a policy instrument would 
have to account for differences in both the impact of discharger wastes and in marginal 
abatement costs.  O’Neil, David, Moore and Joeres (1983) show that TDPs allow annual 
cost savings of around US $6.8m relative to a regulation achieving the same standard of 
water quality. 
2.3.4 Air  pollution 
Tradable rights have proven to be superior to traditional methods for dealing with acid rain 
in the US.  An important departure from traditional CAC was introduced by the Clean Air 
Act 1990.  The Act established the first large-scale environmental policy based on 
tradable emissions permits (Schmalensee, Joskow, Ellermand, Montero and Bailey 1998).  
This program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level, beginning in 1995.   
Legislation established two phases: in phase I total emissions from the dirtiest generating 
units had to satisfy a fixed cap by 1999; in phase II (beginning in 2000) virtually all existing 
and new fossil-fuelled electricity generating units became subject to a tighter cap on total 
emissions.  Generating units were given fixed numbers of quantity-based (tons of SO2) 
tradable permits following rules that depend primarily on historic emissions and fuel use.  
The allowance can be used in the year issued or banked for use in any subsequent year.  
Auctions were used in subsequent years to allocate permits.  The SO2 program not only 
over-achieved the emissions cap, but it did so without extensive litigation and at costs 
lower than had been projected.  It took a number of years for a “competitive” market to 
develop and the development may have been sensitive to program design.  Schmalensee 
et al (1998) note that the program rests on accurate monitoring and enforcement of the 
property rights involved. 
2.3.5  Pricing access to natural resources 
Pricing access to natural resources can be achieved through tradable rights. 
Water rights 
In New South Wales, the Water Management Act 2000 introduced licences for 10-year 
periods.  The terms are the same for all users.  The regulated river licences are either 
high security or general security.  High security licences get 100% of the entitlement in all 
but bad drought years.  General security licences get an allocation each year, which is 
less than 100% of the entitlement.  This is determined and announced annually based on 
storage volumes.  Water licence costs are determined administratively by the Department 
of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC).  The Natural Resource Pricing Unit is currently 
preparing a submission to the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal so it can set  




licence fees (DLWC is a monopoly).  Price is set at a maximum of the cost of delivery and 
it varies from valley to valley.  Prices on the temporary and permanent transfer markets 
are set by the market (in addition to government water charges) and are generally well in 
excess of water charges. 
Water can generally be traded within a valley subject to some geographic rules.  Once 
water is available, licencees have the choice of using or trading their water (temporary 
transfers).  Redistribution is on a commercial basis – it goes to the highest bidder.  
Licences can also be traded permanently.  The Department plays a limited administrative 
role in the water market.  Restrictions in flow or other “natural chokes” can limit transfer.  
There are many traders/brokers in the industry. 
In NSW, Victoria and South Australia markets are developing quickly.  For example, the 
Central Irrigation Trust offers 1,2,3,5, and 10 year leases through their water exchange.  
Internet exchanges exist, and broker services are available.  Most trades are temporary 
and prices reflect variations in duration.  Producers of grapes and citrus require long-term 
secure access to water.  Farmers producing annual crops such as rice and vegetables are 
happy sourcing their water from temporary markets.  Interviews with buyers and sellers in 
Victoria, NSW and South Australia indicate that up to 65% of irrigators who lease out 
water rather than selling it, do so because they believe that the value of their property will 
be disproportionately affected by sale.  A similar proportion of buyers lease water simply 
because they cannot afford to buy water.  Policy uncertainty is another factor influencing 
temporary trades.  Uncertainty arises over environmental standards and Native Title.   
These uncertainties are reflected in the lower price of permanent water. 
The Murray-Darling Basin Commission implemented an inter-state water trading trial in 
1998.  The first permanent inter-state trade was completed in September 1998.  Over the 
next two years, 51 transactions have seen a total of 9.8 GL has been traded among states 
(Young, MacDonald, Stringer and Bjornlund 2000).  The total value of the trades exceeds 
A$9.9 million, more than 90% of the water has moved to South Australia.  The volume 
traded represents about 1% of the total water applied in the area.  Intra-state trading 
drives the market for water. 
The existing arrangements for inter-state trade are complex because it involves 
transferring an entitlement to water among quite different licensing systems.  It can take 
up to 32 days to settle.  In part this arises out of differences in water legislation across 
states.  Exchange rates – that take into account losses through transmission in the river 
channel and losses in changes in the security of supply of water resulting from transfer - 
add a layer of complications.  For example, to protect supply security trades involving 
sellers in SA Murray (high security) to NSW Murray (high security) occur at 0.9.  Brokers 
argue that establishing a simpler, quicker and more transparent water registration system 
is the most pressing issue in lowering the transaction costs of trade. 
Inter-state trading is increasing the value of water in the Murray-Darling Basin.  Almost 
90% of the water sold was not being used by sellers.  Most of the water has gone to high 
value uses.  Around three-quarters has gone into new irrigation development using state-
of the art technology.  In South Australia, water prices have ranged from $500/ML to 
$10,000/ML in the McLaren Vale.  Murray River licenses in South Australia are currently 
trading for $1,000 to A$1,500/ML.  Wine is the key driver.  Although water is key to wine 
production, water costs are a small proportion of production costs – 5-20% for grape 
growers.  




Inter-state trading has produced no measurable adverse social impacts.  The 
environmental impact has “probably” been positive but the volume traded is small in flow 
terms.  Over the long-term inter-state trading is expected to increase river salinity and the 
impact of trade on the environment will depend on the environmental standards in place 
and their enforcement. 
Brozovic, Carey and Sunding (in press) report on water trading in the Westlands Water 
District in California.  Water is allocated according to a priority system – first in time – 
senior rights through more junior rights where right holders get their water only after the 
more senior claims have been satisfied.  The system is hierarchical and analogous to a 
queuing system.  One of the distortions to occur with this system of allocation is that junior 
right holders – who often own superior quality land – are unable to obtain secure rights to 
grow high value tree crops.  There are few administrative barriers to trading and an 
informal market has developed.  By informal, it would seem that farmers must locate 
potential trading partners – this distinction is not particularly significant because 
presumably brokers would fill the gap if there was money to be made from a more formal 
market. 
During the 1993-96 study period 10-14% of the district’s total allocation was traded.  
Trading patterns suggest that some farmers rely on the water market to allow production 
choices that would not otherwise be feasible.  Brozovic  et al conclude that the large 
volume of water traded suggests large benefits to those farms participating. 
One prerequisite for water marketing is that the right to water can be bought or sold 
separate from ownership of the land.  In Chile, Easter, Rosegrant and Dinar (1999) report 
on gains from trade – measured as the difference between the value of water to the seller 
before the sale and the value to the buyer after the sale - for agricultural purposes (urban 
supplies were adequate) in the order of US $2.47 m
3 with a transaction cost of US $0.069 
m
3.  In California transaction costs were US $0.041 m
3 in 1991. 
Fishing rights 
New Zealand’s quota management system (QMS) is a world-leading model of a rights 
based system of management in which profitable enterprise can operate within the 
constraints of sustainable harvest (Sharp, 2002).  With respect to individual quota, 
competition will ensure that the more efficient firms get to harvest fish.  Furthermore, the 
market value of quota provides summary information about current conditions and future 
expectations in the fishery (Batstone and Sharp, forthcoming).  The basic idea of the QMS 
is illustrated in Figure 5 using a shared fishery. 
Each year the Ministry of Fisheries sets a total allowable catch TAC = Q
* and after making 
an allowance for recreational and cultural needs, sets a total allowable commercial catch 
(TACC).  Fishers hold a proportional right to the TACC.  Full economic efficiency depends 
inter alia on whether Q* maximises rent and net-benefits across competing interests are 
equalised.  If the right to harvest is not differentiated, then competition will result in a 
uniform price P
*.  Commercial fishers will harvest  * QC and the non-commercial 
* QNC.  
Provided the TAC is set at the optimal level Q* use of the right is immaterial to achieving 
efficiency.  In the uncertain world of fisheries management it is highly unlikely that Q* will 
be discovered.  




Figure 5 - Tradable rights to sustainable harvest 
2.4 Uncertainty 
Weitzman (1974) examines the choice between prices and quantities of MBIs under 
uncertainty.  Although we could account for uncertainty in an Arrow-Debreu framework by 
designing a tax schedule that is contingent on stated outcomes it would be complicated 
and difficult to implement.  In practice a tax schedule (eg, $ per tonne of SO2) or quota 
(eg, total allowable discharge of SO2) has to be fixed ex ante without knowing the exact 
nature of the costs and benefits.  For example, it might be that climatic conditions are 
stochastic and impact the relevant cost and benefit functions.  Weitzman shows that 
instrument choice cannot be settled definitely in favour of either prices or quantities.  
Choice depends on the relative slopes of the cost and benefit functions. 
Figure 6 shows marginal external costs (MEC) increasing with output.  Marginal benefits 
(MB) are stochastic and each state occurs with equal probability.  Expected welfare is 
maximised where MB = MC and the Piqouvian tax should be t*.  Now let us assume ex 
post that MB = MB0 + ε   consumption is x’’ and the efficiency loss will be $A.  This arises 
because the tax rate is set ex ante instead of ex post.  Alternatively we could use quota of 
q* which maximises expected welfare.  However if MB = MB0 + ε  obtains then the 
efficiency loss is $B.  In this case the tax turns out to be superior than quota.  Relative 
efficiency can easily be reversed by simply rotating MEC anti-clockwise around point e, 
$A will increase and $B decrease.  The general Weitzman result is that taxes are 
preferred if  slope MEC  <  slope MB while quotas would perform better if  slope MEC  
>  slope MB .  It has to be remembered that either instrument has to be implemented 
before the future state of the economy is known.  While the result is useful it should not be 
interpreted as an argument against the use of MBIs because quota in the example could 
easily be interpreted as regulation. 
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2.5  Removal of subsidies 
Panayotou (1996) reports estimates of subsidies worldwide that amount to about 5% of 
the world’s GNP.  He estimates that removing one dollar of subsidies generates 24 cents 
of reduction in environmental damages.  Price support programs work to alter relative 
prices faced by producers and consumers.  While these programs may lead to increases 
in production they can result in at least two externalities.  First, subsidies accelerate 
resource use and depletion.  Second, spillovers are likely to be associated more intensive 
resource use.  For example, subsidised irrigation development can lead to excessive use 
of water, higher inputs of fertiliser into the ecosystem and more livestock waste.  The 
range of possible subsidies is large and includes market price support, payments for 
production, input subsidies, income payments, and subsidised access to natural 
resources. 
Explicit financial support to promote and encourage activities that contribute to positive 
environmental outcomes is often argued  – for example, flood control services, landscape 
protection, wildlife habitat and creation of marine reserves.  While these subsidies may be 
effective in the short term they dampen innovation and increase demand on government 
revenue.  In principle it might be possible to target subsidies to the more efficient 
providers so as to minimise market distortions and avoid permanently subsidising the 
costs of meeting environmental standards. 
A major obstacle to subsidy reform is the rent that producers derive from their supply.  For 
example, if water is delivered free to agriculture then its value will be capitalised into the 
value of land.  Often the benefits of reform are dispersed while the welfare loss is 
concentrated.  For example, a common problem with irrigation development is that users 
derive economic benefit (capitalised into land values) from un-priced water yet users of 
water in situ tend to be dispersed (anglers, recreational groups, etc). 
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2.6  Community based initiatives 
The answer to a simple question: “who should provide public goods?” has not yet received 
a satisfactory answer (Itaya, de Meza and Myles 2000).  National Parks in the US are 
supported by voluntary contributions but in New Zealand they are almost entirely financed 
by government.  The early literature assumed consumer utility was derived solely from the 
total quantity of the public good and that there is no benefit per se from the level of 
individual contribution.  The idea of “warm-glow preferences” grew out of the idea that a 
contribution to the public good (eg, species preservation) generates utility over and above 
the additional level of the public good.  Thus consumers are seen to derive utility directly 
from the act of charity.  A further and related refinement looks at the extent to which 
consumers take into account the implications of their choices on government revenue and 
spending decisions.  Labelled “see through”, this assumption recognises the ability of 
consumers to anticipate a significant reaction from government.  Consumer see-through in 
the case of a donation to a national trust to preserve species would differ according to 
whether the trust operated at a national or local level.  One would expect see-through to 
be greater at lower levels.  The action of a single individual would probably have little 
impact at the national level.  Even with these refinements to models of public goods it is 
not possible to generalise on the optimal mix of government to private contribution to a 
public good.  Much depends on whether private contributions and government 
expenditure are equally efficient in generating public goods. 
The provision of environmental services outside the government sector can be analysed 
using a model developed by Weisbrod (1975).  Using a three-sector model he identified 
factors determining what goods will be provided by government, by private (for-profit) 
markets and by voluntary (non-profit) markets.  Weisbrod allows any tax (or user charge) 
system provided the system does not permit every consumer to equate their tax liability 
with his or her individual marginal benefit.  This effectively excludes the possibility of a 
Lindahl equilibrium.  The assumption also excludes vote trading, bribes or log rolling if the 
effect was to leave each person with a net tax price equal to their evaluation of the 
marginal output. 
Government is assumed to supply a quantity X as determined by the demands of the 
median voter.  Therefore, if consumer-voters know the rule by which government will 
allocate costs among them, their utility functions will generate a set of demand functions 
for government provided goods.  The inability of government to tax/charge individuals at 
their marginal valuation is vital to Weisbrod's model because it means that some voters 
will receive marginal benefits from the collective-consumption good that exceed marginal 
tax, others will receive marginal benefits that are less than the marginal tax.  To simplify 
the exposition, Weisbrod assumes: 1) there are 7 voters, each with a different demand Di 
for water quality (X); 2) the tax-finance rule specifies that costs are borne equally which 
implies that the marginal cost of supply is a constant; and 3) each voter pays the tax paid 
by the median voter, who has demand D4.  To simplify the illustration let us assume that 
demand by voters 5 through 7 is such that D7 > D6 > D5 and demand by voters 4 through 1 
is D4 > D3 > D2 > D1 over all X.  














Figure 7 shows each person paying $P per unit of output.  The majority (persons 4-7) 
prefer to improve water quality (WQ) to X
*.   A minority (persons 1-3) prefer to reduce the 
tax and would prefer a lower level of WQ.  In contrast, persons 5-7 would prefer to 
increase tax and a higher level of WQ.  Assuming a majority voting rule, person 4, the 
median voter, rules the day.  Notice that the intensities of dissatisfaction vary.  For 
example, person 7's dissatisfaction with X
* is given by ABC and person 3's dissatisfaction 
is measured by PAX
*FH. 
If the supply of WQ is institutionally constrained to be either public or private sector, 
choice might well be sub-optimal because of an adjustment to the non-optimal level of 
provision of the public good by government.  Individuals are left in non-optimal positions in 
both private and government markets.  For example, X might describe water quality at a 
local beach.  If supply is determined by the median voter then X* will prevail.  Weisbrod 
suggests that dissatisfied members of the community can take a number of actions. 
They can migrate to another government jurisdiction in which the output and tax pricing 
system improves their economic welfare.  This follows the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis.  
Therefore, some over satisfied and under satisfied consumers may choose to vote with 
their feet.  Those who are willing to pay for more of X may lobby to form lower levels of 
government.  Dissatisfied community members can look to other means of WQ. 
The homogeneity of the voters within the political system is an important determinant of 
the relative number of people desiring change.   The more homogeneous the voting group 
- in terms of tastes, incomes, wealth, etc - the smaller will be the expected variation in 
individual demands and therefore, the smaller the likely degree of dissatisfaction with the 
level of X.   
Contract failure offers some insights into why non-profit organisations are common in the 
provision of public goods.  We use lake management as an example.  Recall that a public 
good has two attributes.   First, the marginal cost of additional consumption is zero, once 
the good has been provided.   Therefore, if a non-profit organisation improves water 
quality by an additional unit then, in the absence of congestion, an additional visitor to a 
lake can derive utility from this improvement at no added cost to the organisation.   
















marginal valuation.  But there is no incentive for the individual to do this because the 
amount contributed is so small relative to the total that the person's non-subscription 
would have little impact on total supply.   The individual can free ride which suggests that 
the private market is an inefficient means of providing the goods and services. 
Why could we not expect the use of for-profit organisations in lake management?  A for-
profit organisation would have an incentive to get as much money as possible and 
distribute this to its owners.   However, with a non-profit the supplier of money is assured 
that the money will in fact be used for the service and not for profit dispersement.  The 
problem relates to the indivisible nature of the service involved.   Assume that we are 
dealing with water quality.   There is no obvious connection between a dollar contributed 
and water quality.   But, this being so, the contributor can be assured that the dollar 
contributed will in fact be used for water quality improvement.   If the individual could 
ascertain the incremental amount of water quality provided by the contribution then there 
is no a priori reason why non-profit should be preferred over for-profit organisational form.   
Free-rider refers to the lack of incentive to contribute to the cost of the public good.   
Whereas contract failure refers to the inability to control the use of monies obtained from 
contributions. 
Hansmann (1980) argues that non-profit organisations are a response to contract failure.  
Another interesting issue becomes apparent when we follow this line of reasoning further.  
Each individual could set up a contract with the organisation to prevent profit 
dispersement, which places the costs of contracting and policing on the individual.  With a 
non-profit organisation, the state and members of the community can take action if 
management compensates itself too generously.   In this light, the non-profit is a means of 
economising on the transactions costs of contracting and enforcement.  Transaction costs 
are minimised by putting them under one umbrella organisational form.  The contract is 
determined by the state's corporate law and policed by the state.  Therefore, rather than 
requiring each organisation to set its own rules, the state is able to set the broad 
parameters under legislation thereby economising on transaction costs. 
2.6.1 Other  initiatives 
Initiatives undertaken by firms and groups are important for diffusing improved 
environmental practices.  Increased attention by firms to their environmental and social 
performance often reflects market pressure and many are beginning to incorporate triple 
bottom line reporting. 
Corporate codes of conducts are within firm initiatives for sensitising employees, suppliers 
and contractors to management’s expectations concerning environmental and social 
performance of the enterprise. 
Negotiated agreements involve voluntary adherence to a public program or a negotiated 
commitment for specific improvements.  Agreements are typically self-monitoring and non-
binding which may lead to concern.  Negotiated agreements often suffer from weak 
controls, free riding, high transaction costs and regulatory capture (OECD, 2001).  
However these agreements may contribute to raising awareness and disseminating 
information. 
Voluntary agreements can play a role in improving environmental quality.  Economists 
have traditionally taken a sceptical attitude to the idea that persuading people to change 
their behaviour can correct externalities.  The standard objection is that individuals with 
stable preferences will change behaviour only if incentives change.  If environmental  




quality is in the nature of a public good then the incentive to protect and improve 
environmental quality on a voluntary basis is dilute.   However people do volunteer, re-
cycle and join in to clear the litter of others.  Of course, preferences can and do change as 
individuals receive information but the incentive problem remains.  Even if consumers are 
aware of global warming is this sufficient to get them to switch to alternative modes of 
transport? 
Information programs can play a role to increase awareness and action by consumers to 
reduce the environmental impact of their consumption patterns.  These initiatives may 
include eco-labelling and certification schemes.   
2.7 Conclusions 
Economics provides a conceptual and analytical framework for developing and applying 
market-based instruments to environmental externalities.  The efficient price of pollution 
exactly balances marginal damage with marginal benefit.  Looked at another way, the 
marginal cost of abatement equals the marginal benefit associated with pollution 
reduction.  In order to achieve the efficient outcome, we need information on both costs 
and benefits – both sides of the “market” must somehow reveal these data. 
Turning to the practical aspects of policy, the cost of abatement should in principle be 
known to industry and it is plausible to assume cost-minimising behaviour.  When faced 
with a price for pollution individual polluters will seek less polluting technology, including 
adjusting management.  Obtaining information on the damages avoided is not as 
straightforward.  Damages are measured in terms of their impact on the welfare of 
consumers and producers.  Furthermore, the damage estimate is assumed to include 
different spatial and temporal impacts.  Obviously, the benefit side of the equation is 
absent in real world settings.  Unlike costs, there is no market mechanism in operation 
that we can rely on to signal the value of damages avoided. 
We cannot assume that the environmental regulator is omniscient.  Although practical 
policy might – and indeed should be – guided by estimates of value we are left with a 
“second-best” approach where a standard is set.  This issue is how best to achieve the 
desired standard.  Historically, central and local governments have relied primarily on 
regulations to meet their environmental goals.  From the outset we must note that both 
CAC and polluter pays require a standard.  Governments usually set standards after 
considering scientific evidence and stakeholder preferences.  Thus the issue for 
sustainable development is whether or not a policy instrument achieves the standard at 
least-cost.  To do otherwise unnecessarily increases expenditures in the present.  
Regulations that impose a technology on industry will not adequately account for the 
heterogeneity of firms nor will the imposed technology minimise cost.  Regulation will not 
produce the desired outcome at least-cost.  Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. 
If we step away from the Pigouvian ideal and admit the practical (costly) difficulty of 
measuring damages then the damage function can be thought of as a target (ie, a vertical 
line in terms of Figure 1).   Policy makers have a choice of using a pricing instrument or 
quota.  Polluter pays provides an opportunity cost to the polluter that acts as an on-going 
incentive to implement less costly abatement technology. 
Defining tradable rights to the standard provides similar incentives.  Tradable permits 
provide a degree of certainty over achieving environmental outcomes, provided of course, 
enforcement is effective.  Defining the permits as shares – as opposed to a quantity –  




provides flexibility for temporal adjustments to the target.  Factors limiting the use of 
tradable permits include complexity of establishing a functioning market; agreement on 
how to initially allocate rights; and, concerns about market concentration.  In contrast, 
although polluter pays may prove easier to set the initial “price” this price may not result in 
the environmental outcome desired.  Getting price adjustments through the political 
process might prove difficult. 
Economic instruments produce a richer response on both sides of the market.  For 
example, a tax on the sulphur content of fuel would work on both sides of the market, 
consumers would be encouraged to save on fuel and producers encouraged to supply 
lower sulphur fuels.  Tradable rights also create incentives.  For example, the cost of 
TDPs would become an integral part of the cost of production – firms will face an incentive 
to develop and use less-polluting technologies and consumers of the product will have to 
at least meet the additional cost of production. 
There is no blueprint or algorithm to follow when considering whether to regulate or turn to 
market-based instruments.  Good economic reasons might exist for adopting regulations.  
For example, diffuse non-point sources of pollution are difficult to tackle using market 
based instruments.  Technology will continue to offer scope for switching from regulation 
to market based instruments.  For example, road access is electronically priced in 
Melbourne, some cities overseas are seriously considering pricing access to storm water, 
the technology exists to price vehicle emissions, and so on.  Analysts and policy advisors 
must first be able to characterise the problem and carefully weigh-up the relative merits of 
each approach.  Furthermore, choice between taxes and quotas as instruments of 
pollution control should be sensitive to the nature of the uncertainties involved. 
This section has shown how better defined property rights can make a significant 
contribution to sustainable development.  Devolving rights to communities, empowering 
them to “manage” the local resource, providing technical (and possibly financial) 
assistance, is a powerful instrument.  There are good working examples of how devolution 
to non-government organisations has produced significant environmental gains. 
In conclusion, market based instruments score relatively highly in terms of sustainable 
development.  Concepts such as total economic value and concern for future generations 
can be directly addressed and incorporated.  Within the generic set of options laid out 
above, there exists a huge range of potential applications.  Discovering the most 
appropriate instrument can only come about from careful analysis.  Ill-conceived 
proposals for the use of MBIs will not gain the acceptance needed for implementation.  




3  Institutions and sustainable development 
In Sharp (2001), sustainable development was shown to encompass four categories of 
capital, concern for intergenerational equity and the explicit recognition of total economic 
value.  The instruments discussed in Section 2 provide a basis for the formation of policies 
for sustainable development.  Understanding the mapping of policy instruments (MBIs and 
CAC) into economic and environmental outcomes is crucial to providing a foundation for 
sustainable development.  Policy instruments belong to the set of institutions that exist 
within New Zealand society.  The set of institutions (S) refers to the laws, rules, and 
restrictions that directly and indirectly constrain the opportunity sets and influence the 
decisions of individuals within society.  Institutional structure includes all the formal and 
informal rules that provide opportunities for economic growth including rules that work to 
influence the actions of people where externalities are involved.  For example, rules 
governing the use of water sit alongside rules protecting environmental interests.  
Property rights associated with water use combine with laws and rules governing the 
formation of irrigation companies, contracts governing the supply of inputs to and outputs 
from agricultural firms.    
This section is aimed at providing a basis for assessing the quality of institutional 
arrangements and decision-making structures within the framework of sustainable 
development.  At a conceptual level, we have the following relationship: 
                  Q = f(P,S,R) 
where: 
   Q = set of sustainable development indicators; 
   R = resource endowment; 
   P = preferences of people, objectives of firms and agencies; and, 
   S = institutional structure. 
In the context of sustainable development, we are interested in the relationship between 
indicators of sustainable development Q and the variables R, S and P.  For example, 
qw∈ Q might represent the flow of economic benefits associated with water allocation (use 
and nonuse) (R), regional water allocation rules (S) and the preferences of individuals and 
firms (P). 
3.1  Institutions and sustainable development policy 
Institutions provide a fundamental link between sustainable development policy and public 
sector organisations, commercial organisations, communities and individuals.  Looking at 
the Resource Management Act we see that its purpose is to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources.  This is not to say that parliament-made 
rules are primal source of society’s institutional framework.   
Kasper and Streit (1998) distinguish between external and internal institutions.  External 
institutions  are imposed on society by political action.  External institutions can be 
procedural rules that instruct agents of government on process, consultation, and so on.   




Because they are prescriptive, external institutions place a high requirement on 
information and knowledge.   For example, water pollution might be governed by rules that 
instruct public sector officials to set standards at a predetermined level.  Officials then set 
limits on discharges that are considered to bring about the predetermined outcome.  
External institutions can also provide a platform for decentralised decision-making.  For 
example, New Zealand’s quota management system is an external institution that 
provides the basis for the trade of rights to harvest fish. 
Internal institutions evolve within a group or community as a result of experience.  For 
example, quota owner associations are internal institutional arrangements that evolved as 
a result of a group forming to protect and enhance the value of quota rights. 
Philosophers such as John Locke and Friedrich Hayek emphasised that the structure of 
politically determined institutions (external) had to rest on internal institutions such as 
conventions about behaviour, custom and manners.  External institutions are designed 
and imposed on a community by government with the political power to coerce.  
Institutions constrain opportunistic behaviour and carry sanctions for breaches of the rules 
(North, 1990; Ostrom 1990).  External institutions imply a degree of hierarchy, formal 
sanctions exist for violating the rules (eg, a firm caught violating the conditions of its 
discharge permit) and are often backed-up by a third-party (eg, civil law). 
At the most fundamental level, institutions can be thought of as rules that apply to the 
community.  In a narrow sense, institutions provide a set of rules that govern market 
exchange, the supply of services from government and the distribution of goods and 
services in the economy (Davis and North, 1971).  These rules can be the product of 
parliament (eg, Resource Management Act) and regional government (eg, pollution 
regulations in a Regional Plan), the Environment Court (eg, a ruling on best management 
practices), company-specific rules (eg, a stock enhancement company’s rules on quota 
violations), rules set by government to guide the management of a community resource 
(eg, coastal care groups), and so on. 
In the context of sustainable development some of the major reasons given in the 
literature as to why governments become involved in designing and imposing institutions 
include the so-called “tragedy of the commons”, which arise because of ill-defined 
property rights; attempts to overcome the problem of free riding assets that have 
indivisible costs or benefits, where exclusion is difficult; and, the provision of a basis for 
people to make credible contractual commitments that can be enforced by third parties. 
In most modern economies, significant resources are used to coordinate the activities of 
individuals, firms and units of government.   According to Arrow (1969) coordination costs 
are simply the costs of running the economic system.  Figure 8 illustrates the costs of 
owning and using property.  





















The above distinction (external/internal) is useful if we link the external rules (which are 
controllable to varying degrees by policy makers) to observable sustainable development 
outcomes.  For example, in principle it should be possible to link regional rules governing 
land development with economic benefit - net of development costs, opportunity costs, 
external costs and compliance costs.  In addition, external institutions also provide an 
opportunity for innovation and wealth creation by providing a basis for the development of 
new, possibly internal, institutions and unleash a dynamic that fosters sustainable 
development. 
3.2 Institutional  structure 
In the case of environmental externalities, information on willingness-to-pay and 
opportunity cost will not directly emerge from the market.  As was noted in Section 2, the 
market price of goods and services will not signal the relevant marginal cost of using the 
environment - information that the objective of efficiency is sensitive to.   Information costs 
are important when analysing the relative efficiency of alternative structures for controlling 
externalities.  What organisational arrangement will produce information about the costs 
and benefits of environmental management most efficiently? 
3.2.1 Hierarchy 
Hierarchies of external institutions consist of rules are a number of levels.  Figure 9 shows 
a hierarchy of rules, beginning with a written constitution (which NZ does not have); 
statute law and regulations at the bottom.  The hierarchy provides a basis for private 
contracts that occur at a decentralised level and how they are to be interpreted should 
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disputes arise.  Hierarchies of this nature provide a basis for creating order and 
maintaining consistency over time. 

































Hierarchies are characterised by status and authority being ranked vertically.  The key 
function for a hierarchy of rules is to provide a basis for the evolution of internally 
consistent rules and governance.  Higher order institutions (eg, Resource Management 
Act) provide a framework confining change and laying out how changes should be made 
at lower levels (eg, rules specified in regional plans).  This is essential for a predictable 
functioning of the institutional system over time.  A lack of hierarchy can inhibit institutional 
evolution and result in uncertainty. 
3.2.2  Locus of control 
When considering the institutional structure for dealing with the problem of externalities it 
is natural to ask: at what level should the environmental externality be resolved? To 
examine this question let us assume that non-point sources of pollution are having an 
adverse effect on the water quality of lakes in region 1 and region 2.  Should pollution 
control activity be decided at the central or local level? To examine the arguments for and 
against national control of pollution let us assume: 
Basic rules of law  
Statute law 
Regulations/ by-laws 
Constrain and protect the rights of individuals and firms 
Specific 
Broad  Checks against  
norms of society 








yi = Fi(x) = net output per capita, where Fi(x) is unique to local environments, i = 1,2 
p =  (px, py) = price of pollution and net output, py = 1. 
To begin, let us restrict our attention to region 1.  Efficient use of the environment is priced 
at p1 where the price of pollution p1(x1) equals the marginal value productivity of pollution 
(F’(x1)p1).  If we now consider two regions 1 and 2, located at their respective optima x1 
and x2, we see that region 2 has lower pollution control costs because p1 > p2.   However 
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which violates the necessary conditions for Pareto optimality.  In other words, pollution 
producing activity should be shifted from region 1 to region 2 because this will result in a 
smaller sacrifice in output in order to achieve the same level of environmental quality.  
Achieving equality in prices may be difficult because each locality might consider the 
adjacent community’s environment as a free good.  The threat of relocation is considered 
as an argument in favour of central control.  For example, assume that region 1 proposed 
a levy of p1 so that X1 could be attained.  A large industry could act as a monopsonist and 
threaten to relocate which could lead to a decrease in regional welfare.  This threat would 
be less credible if a national levy on pollution was implemented. 
The strength of the argument for a national environmental pricing policy depends on the 
public good nature of the externality.  If there are no spillovers between regions then there 
is no need for the price of pollution damage to be the same in the two areas.  Even if 
regional interdependencies require identical prices for pollution damage this does not 
mean that regions should levy the same price on emissions.  Differences in the 
relationship between emissions and damages may require different charges on emissions.  
The apparent economy of information is perhaps the strongest argument in favour of local 
control.  In any event, if the Teibout (1956) hypothesis is accepted then relocation will tend 
to bring about national price uniformity in the long run. 
If we were to vary population, incomes, tastes, topography, climate and so on, both price 
and quantity could be expected to vary across regions.  Information on the equilibrium will 
not come cheap and we might ask the three questions which arise from the model shown 
in Figure 10.  Will evaluation of costs and benefits be more accurate if made the 
responsibility of localities experiencing the costs and benefits? How will the correct price 
be determined? What is the cost of providing the information? 
The logic of this model suggests the outcome associated with local decisions is efficient 
and the organisation need know nothing about the price attached to pollution elsewhere.   
Furthermore, a net-benefit maximising government organisation would not impose a 
different set of prices.   Efficient pricing is therefore consistent with both state and local 
control and the issue becomes: which form of control is likely to yield more accurate 
information on costs and benefits?   














The public good nature of the output (cleaner air) requires local decision making to 
consider those significantly affected by pollution.   Unless it is a national externality, such 
as might exist with an endangered species, then it would appear that local organisations 
should be more efficient.   In addition, it is plausible that local organisations have a 
comparative advantage in obtaining information on preferences and implementing 
decisions, provided of course, they are so empowered.   However, there would be 
situations where economies of scale associated with certain projects that would give a 
national-level agency a comparative cost advantage.  For example, although it might be 
reasonable for all ports to have an oil-spill strategy it would probably make sense to share 
the burden of supplying the necessary clean-up technology. 
3.2.3 Subsidiarity 
Looking elsewhere for models dealing with the question of central or local control we find 
similar arguments emerging over the principle of subsidiarity.  Van den Bergh (1996) 
proposes fundamental questions about the role European institutions are playing and 
about their capacity to exercise power in a way that enhances economic welfare.  
Arguments in favour of decentralisation derive from the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that 
individuals and firms will vote with their feet by moving to jurisdictions that best suit their 
preferences.  Arguments in favour of decentralisation are listed below. 
In practice there is a need to cope with informational asymmetries between regulatory 
authorities and regulated firms.  Regulatory authorities (principals) may have an 
informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the firms (agents) they seek to regulate.  For 
example, polluting firms may not fully reveal information on their emissions to the 
environmental agency.  Monitoring and auditing will of course limit non-disclosure but this 
comes at a cost.  Although information asymmetries might suggest greater 
decentralisation there remains a possibility that the benefits gained from a reduction in 
information costs are outweighed by regulatory capture.  Regulatory capture can be 
attenuated by improving accountability either through the competitive market mechanism 
or through the political process to the general public; promoting a degree of operational 
independence from politicians; and improving the transparency of process and linking 
actions to outcomes. 
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Differences in rules provide an opportunity for “learning from doing”.  For example, two 
jurisdictions might approach the control of point sources of water pollution using two 
different instruments - A might choose to use transferable discharge permits while B 
chooses to use polluter pays.  Provided we can adequately control for other differences a 
cross-jurisdictional comparison might provide useful information on the design and 
application of MBIs.  We might also learn why firms choose to locate in one jurisdiction 
over another. 
Arguments in favour of centralisation are based on the existence of externalities, scale 
and transaction cost economies and game theory. 
Central rule making might be more appropriate if there are significant spillovers between 
jurisdictions.  If there are significant economies of scale (falling average costs) associated 
with governance and the provision of services then centralisation may be required.  Scale 
economies may be important in the production of information needed to formulate and 
enforce rules.  It should be noted that contracting out provides an opportunity to substitute 
for centralised production.  For example, it would probably be difficult to argue that every 
regional council should have the research capacity of major research providers in order to 
fulfil their statutory duties.  Contracting specifically for these services is an obvious 
substitute. 
When jurisdictions compete under prisoners’ dilemma conditions the outcome may be 
worse than a centrally produced rule.  A jurisdiction can gain in the competition for 
industry by choosing lax rules, when others don’t act in the same way.  The idea of the 
“race for the bottom” follows the prisoners’ dilemma model where if all jurisdictions follow 
(ie, adopt lax rules) then industry gains.  According to Van den Bergh (1996) this 
phenomenon has yet to be empirically substantiated. 
3.2.4 Moral  hazard 
Another result is offered by Caillaurd, Julien and Picard (1996) who build a hierarchical 
model of contractual relationships under moral hazard (Grossman and Hart, 1983) to 
analyse subsidiarity.  While their study was looking at optimal (de)centralisation  of 
industrial policy it does provide some insights for sustainable development policy.  
Producers make unobservable decisions that have spillover effects.  A central agency 
designs and proposes a system of incentives for firms whose decisions involve private 
costs and are imperfectly observed.   Then local regulators and their firms negotiate a 
contract that complements the central contract.  It is assumed that each local regulator 
has more precise information on domestic firms than all other regulators.  Full 
centralisation is not optimal when local regulators have an informational advantage.  The 
optimum relies on both central and local policies.  The tradeoff involves rents left to 
producers because of inefficiency arising from poor information at the central level versus 
rents left to producers endowed with some bargaining power in local negotiations.  Full 
decentralisation may be optimal when the information advantage of local regulators is 
large and they have sufficient bargaining power in local negotiations.  Full decentralisation 
means that the centre does not design incentives for firms.  At least partial 
decentralisation is optimal provided that the regulatory bodies in the locality have better 
information than central government. 
The optimal assignment problem has at least two dimensions: 1) how many hierarchies 
are optimal; 2) what is the optimal size of jurisdictions at each level of the hierarchy? 
Gilbert and Picard (1996) developed a model of optimal territorial decentralisation in which 
smaller units of government have an informational advantage concerning the costs of  




producing public goods and central government has an informational advantage on 
spillover effects induced by local projects.  They limit themselves to a hierarchy of two and 
focus on the optimal size of jurisdictions.  The main argument for giving local government 
more powers is the potential ability to achieve their tasks with respect to the information 
they are able to gather.  Their model deals with local government contracting with a firm to 
produce a local public good.  The public good is cost-shared between central government 
and local taxpayers and involves national spillovers.  Local government is only concerned 
with maximising the welfare of its own citizens.   The information local government has 
about the project’s costs increases as the jurisdiction gets smaller but greater 
decentralisation entails more uncertainty about spillover effects.  The optimal size results 
from two diverging objectives: to save costs by delegating the decision to a smaller unit of 
government or to internalise externalities more easily by delegating powers to a larger 
jurisdiction. 
Offsetting the argument that greater knowledge and concern that smaller jurisdictions 
have for their environment are a number of counter-arguments.   First central government 
has the resources and legal standing to act in the international domain; national 
governments can resist two structural forces that systematically favour less environmental 
protection.  Second, there is a race to the bottom in regulatory policy as jurisdictions 
compete to keep and attract investment.   Third, there is greater sectoral concentration of 
smaller economies.   
Canadian experience – where provincial governments are highly solicitous of predominant 
local industry and resource sectors - supports the last case.  However evidence on the 
race to the bottom is ambiguous.  Empirical studies in the 1980s found that environmental 
standards were a strong location factor for only a few extremely dirty industries.  As 
Parson (2000) points out, to observe that capital rarely leaves because of environmental 
regulations does not mean that firms threaten to do so.  In Parson’s view, politicians and 
officials do believe the risk of losing investment and job creation even though studies 
show the risk to be low. 
Is appropriate environmental protection systematically more likely to be blocked at smaller 
scales than national? The evidence in Canada is mixed.  The most pervasive argument 
for smaller scale is that it allows diverse standards and approaches.  Such diversity 
should promote learning about the effectiveness of alternative responses, provided 
variation is informative and adequately monitored.  Diversity should reveal real costs.   
Canadian environmental institutions are following a trend toward intentionally devolving 
some aspects of their authority to non-state sectors.  Firms have better access to 
information about their operations than regulators do so delegating implementation should 
realise environmental goals with greater efficiency.   The essence of MBIs is that they 
seek more efficient division of responsibility where the state sets environmental goals 
while firms use their greater knowledge of technical possibilities and influence over 
internal behaviour to find better and cheaper means to those ends. 
The environmental trends project undertaken in Canada described three challenges for 
environmental governance: (1) need of adaptive management; (2) increased institutional 
capacity to deal with environmental protection at the international level; and, (3) networks 
of shared authority to reconcile overlapping capacity and authority between levels of 
government.  Given uncertainty and complexity of environmental management, precise 
and static divisions of responsibility are unlikely to be viable.  Thus we need to examine: 
the resolution of coordination problems between different levels of government and 
between private and public sector actors; information flows and sharing of authority; and,  




the competitive dynamics between authorities and evaluate particular innovative forms of 
governance, including how have they performed in terms of behaviour and environmental 
outcomes. 
3.3 Property  rights 
How people use environmental resources is not simply a technological matter, rather it is 
a result of the institutions governing economic activity.  Property rights institutions are 
especially important when considering policies for achieving sustainable development.  
Property rights are as fundamental to economics as scarcity and rationality.  Property 
rights include the laws, customs and regulations governing the rights and obligations of 
individuals and firms to have access to and use the environment.  The standard economic 
model is a private (excludability) property rights economy.  Under private property rights 
any mutually agreed contractual terms are possible although not necessarily supported by 
government enforcement (eg, illegal transferring of rights). 
For decentralised coordination of production and consumption to work efficiently, in a 
society with diffused knowledge, individuals must have secure private property rights that 
are tradable at mutually agreed prices with relatively low costs of contracting.  There is 
little disagreement that stronger private property rights are more valuable than weaker 
private property rights. 
Many different types of property rights exist in the economy, including private property, 
collective property and public property.  This broad categorisation is of limited use for 
analysing systems of property rights.  Scott (1996) describes three essential powers 
enjoyed by a sole owner of land: (1) to manage the land; (2) to dispose of the land by 
selling, leasing or bequeathing it; and, (3) to appropriate the rent for income flowing from 
the land.  A measurement of the strength of power (ie, the value of property rights) 
depends on the nature of the property rights in land.  In the market we observe that the 
unit price of a 30-year lease is less than freehold title.  Similarly, land differentiated only by 
the relative threat of land use controls will trade at different prices.  It might be considered 
illegal to open a shop for business on certain days of the year – the effect of this 
restriction reduces the strength (attenuates) of the private property right. 
Greater insights can be gained by viewing property rights as comprising a bundle of rights.  
For example, a water permit under the Resource Management Act 1991 has a number of 
strands: (1) water is vested in the Crown; (2) the permit holder may have the freedom to 
decide when and where to use the permitted quantity; (3) the permit holder may transfer 
the permit to a subsequent owner of the land; (4) the permit holder may not transfer the 
permit to another person outside the catchment area; (5) during times of shortage the 
regional council can impose rationing; and so on. 
Continuing with water, the following characteristics give shape to the structure of property 
rights and in doing so determine their value to water users: 
Duration: the length of time a user holds a legal claim against the profit associated with 
use.  Other things being equal, water rights of longer duration are relatively more valuable.  
Duration is particularly important when asset-specific investments (eg, irrigation 
infrastructure) are needed to exploit the full economic potential of water. 
Exclusivity: refers to the ability of individual users to appropriate the profits associated 
with their investment and operational decisions.  Greater exclusivity more directly aligns 
profits with costs.  




Transferability: rights that are transferable are relatively more valuable.  Transferability 
enables the right to move to its most highly valued use in the market.  Moreover, 
transferability unleashes a dynamic that enables profit-seeking individuals to innovate and 
develop new and more profitable forms of enterprise. 
Transformability: refers to the ability to legally transform the right into a derivative right.  
Thus a water right of fixed duration – say 30 years – could be leased out to a neighbour 
on an annual basis.  This improves the flexibility of the right – farmer A growing crop Z this 
year may not require the full water allocation; if transformable into a lease, A could 
transfer a portion to farmer D who needs additional water to meet the requirements of 
crop Y. 
Quality of title: high quality title is secure and relatively less vulnerable to challenge by 
other users or government.  Higher quality title is relatively more valuable. 
For example, in California the market value of a water right held in perpetuity is about 5 
times that of an annual lease right (Saliba and Bush, 1987).  The price of fishing quota 
rights in New Zealand varies with quota management area, allowable catch limits and 
economic variables such as harvesting costs, interest rates and so on (Batstone and 
Sharp, forthcoming). 
In 1934 ranchers in the US were granted rights to forage flows on public lands.  Although 
relatively insignificant in terms of US livestock production grazing is important to rural 
communities.   Competition for rights to forage has increased with the increase in demand 
for alternative uses – eg, wildlife, retired grazing land – of federal land.  In a Coasian world 
with zero transaction costs and tradable rights, competition would resolve the allocation 
problem and yield an efficient outcome.  For example, conservation groups wanting to 
exclude cattle from public lands would buy grazing rights from ranchers.  External 
institutions – in this case federal law – do not allow for market transactions of this nature.  
Egan and Watts (1998) provide an estimate of the risk of appropriation facing ranchers.  In 
1978 the risk index started at 0.94 and declined steadily through 1994 to 0.23.  The real 
(1992) total loss of grazing value over this period was US$10.9 m. 
3.4 Institutional  change 
Most institutional change is incremental.  Dovers (2001) sees purposeful incrementalism 
capable of producing profound change.  In his opinion, initiatives in Australia have been in 
the nature of disjointed incrementalism, characterised by ad hocery and amnesia.  Of 
course it is not easy to keep a complex institutional system internally consistent, 
compatible, and cohesive over time.  A proliferation of specific detailed rules is not a sign 
of good governance.  As rules proliferate the system becomes dysfunctional. 
3.4.1 Institutional  reform 
Enhancing the coordinative power of institutions is an important aspect of institutional 
reform (Epstein, 1995).  It is useful to consider institutional reform in first and second-
order terms (Sharp, 1996a). 
First-order reform refers to getting the basics of institutional structure aligned with policy 
objectives.  For example, two key institutions – tradable rights working within a 
sustainable harvest – underpin New Zealand’s quota management system.  Second-order 
reforms are marginal adjustments occurring within the basic structure.  These reforms  




might be internal to the industry – as evidenced by the formation of quota owner 
associations in the fishing industry – or external when the rights to harvest were re-
defined from being a tonnage to a percentage of the allowable commercial catch.   
3.4.2  Evolution of property rights 
A property right is a socially enforced right to selected uses of an economic good or 
service.  Alternative views on how property rights came into being will not the discussed 
here (Libecap, 1986).  The idea is to look at how and why existing institutions change in 
response to changes in variables such as demand, factor endowments and technology.  
Establishing and protecting property rights is an economic activity.  It is useful however to 
consider the economic variables that affect property rights (Anderson and Hill, 1975).  If 
we represent activity by X then an increase in X suggests an increase in search activity.  
Marginal benefit  (MB) depends on the asset’s value and the degree to which the activity 
enables value to be captured.  As scarcity increases we might expect individuals to 
attempt to better define rights.  The marginal cost (MC) of producing property rights 
increase because of the opportunity cost of resources used in property rights activity.  
Anderson and Hill use this model to explain and predict the evolution of property 
institutions.  Exogenous changes, for example increased theft and crime, to the probability 
of being able to capture the benefits would reduce the benefit function.  Similarly, if the 
asset’s value increased because of price increases (for example, the price of timber) 
would shift the benefit outwards.  Changes in technology and a fall in the price of inputs 
would work to lower the MC curve.  For example, advances in surveillance monitoring 
systems would contribute to lowering the marginal cost of rights based systems of 
governance.  












3.4.3  Establishing a basis for endogenous change 
One of the most powerful changes that can be made to an external institution is to provide 
a platform for evolution and economic growth.  Endogenous change is possible within an 
open system but it cannot occur in a closed system.  Figure 12 illustrates the idea. 
Under a tightly regulated system of governance there is little prospect – other than 
through the imposition of new external institutional arrangements – for innovation to occur.  
In contrast, under an open system new entities (shown as E in Figure 12) can emerge 
according to the forces described in Anderson and Hill (1975).  The following two 
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The Southern Scallop Enhancement Company (SCEC) is an organisation based on 
ownership of rights to scallop quota (Sharp, 2002).  Obviously, the SCEC was not a 
feasible organisation prior to the 1986 Fisheries Amendment Act that shepherded in 
individual transferable quota (ITQ) rights.  Thus the 1986 legislation is an “external 
institution” or “a first order reform” that enabled SCEC to form.  Significant innovations 
were suddenly made possible from this platform – rights in the scallop fishery were further 
refined.  Examples of these “internal institutions” or “second order changes” include rules 
governing harvest, sanctions for violating company rules, rules for supporting research, 
and so on.  The point to be made here is that parliament-made rules (external) provide a 
basis for the evolution of other rules (internal). 
In 1974 the Wisconsin state legislature recognised the threat to environmental values and 
public welfare caused by the deterioration of lakes.   The legislature acknowledged that 
the current state effort was not sufficient and noted that the public will benefit from the 
protection and rehabilitation of these public lakes.  Wisconsin Lake Management Law was 
enacted in 1974, authorising a joint state-local partnership that permits local property 
owners to organise a lake management district to manage and improve the lake in their 
community.  This evolution of organisational structures is a process of adjusting the rights, 
the opportunities, and powers of lake property owners relative to the public.   Of particular 
interest is the opportunity for a local community-state relationship to emerge as an 
effective partnership in lake management.   There are approximately 130 Lake 
Management Districts, over 300 Voluntary Lake Associations and about 30 Town Sanitary 

























3.4.4 Path  dependency 
In the absence of first-order reforms (Sharp, 1996) the evolution of new institutional 
arrangements will be determined to varying degrees by the institutional structure ex ante.  
The emergence of quota owner associations provides an example of path dependency.  
Carey and Sunding (2001) show how the development of water markets is path 
dependent, varying with the institutional structure emerging from pre-existing property 
rights and political battles to build consensus and obtain federal money for financing 
projects.  A case study involving two federal government projects – the California Central 
Valley Project (CVP) and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (C-BT) illustrates how 
different market outcomes have emerged from different institutional structures.  Most CVP 
water trades are limited to short-term transactions within the agricultural sector, and are 
often informal.  In contrast C-BT water is transferred in both short and long-term rental 
markets and permanent sales within and between agricultural and urban sectors.  Within 
the C-BT region there are well-established market prices and water brokers mediate 
exchange between anonymous users.  Four institutional features explain the differences 
in market activity: 
Water district structure: the federal agency negotiates with multiple entities within the CVP 
whereas it negotiates with only one entity in C-BT. 
Water rationing mechanism: a priority system is used to ration water in CVP while a 
proportional rationing system is used within C-BT. 
Acreage limitations: CVP imposes acreage limitations whereas C-BT does not. 
Return flow rules: CVP has relatively stricter return flow rules that are designed to protect 
third parties against adverse effects associated with transfer. 
In addition to security of tenure and establishing an initial allocation of rights, the above 
study highlights the importance of allowing water markets to adapt to long-run changes in 
water demand.  In other words, institutional design should allow for the evolution of new 
arrangements over time. 
3.5  Barriers to implementing market based instruments 
One of the key elements of sustainable development involves balancing the 
environmental damages avoided with the costs of abatement.  Section 2 has outlined the 
necessary conditions for efficiency and it was suggested that instrument choice centres 
around either a pricing (polluter-pays) or quantity-based (tradable rights) approach.  The 
typical response is to use regulations that have a strong technological content based on 
BAT.  Capture of policy formulation by advocating and adopting technical solutions may 
give insufficient scope for innovation.  One BAT will not satisfy the requirements of 
heterogeneous firms.   Furthermore, burdensome regulations that are not least-cost will 
emerge if regulators are risk averse.  Monitoring and enforcement will increase the cost of 
CAC.  Economic instruments avoid many of these problems. 
Why has it proved difficult to introduce MBIs? First, there might be significant income 
effects associated with environmental charges.  Take fuel as an example.  A relatively 
large increase in price (we have noted earlier that it is price inelastic) would be needed to 
encourage the public to switch to less polluting transport.  The tax will have income 
effects.  The political consequences of increasing the fuel tax are immediate while the 
reduction in pollution is longer term.  The second reason is institutional.  In the UK, Helm 
(2000) asserts that institutional structure is responsible for at least two major weaknesses.  
Targets and standards are set with too little regard to the costs and benefits, and there is  




a strong bias towards CAC regulation.  The British approach to pollution control is 
characterised as piecemeal, pragmatic, technically driven and conducted by experts 
largely out of reach of the courts. 
The dichotomy between strong sustainability (SS) and weak sustainability (WS) has 
created a problem for decision-makers by suggesting a two-tier approach to developing 
policies for sustainable development.  There will be uncertainties which current science is 
unlikely to be able to resolve creating doubts as to whether policy should target SS or WS, 
which natural assets are critical and which are not.  Policy choice is more complex than 
the simple WS-SS dichotomy suggests.  When confronted with uncertainty it is relatively 
easy for decision-makers to adopt rules such as the precautionary principle (Morris, 2000; 
Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) where conservation is encouraged when there is not full 
scientific knowledge of the consequences or the safe minimum standard approach 
(Bishop, 1978) which introduces a conservative benchmark into the cost-benefit 
framework.  Both decision rules focus debate on what constitutes compelling evidence. 
Typically the returns to investment in the environment are non-market valued and 
therefore it is likely that under-investment will occur in environmental assets while over-
investing in environmentally damaging activities.  For example, over the years the quality 
of water in Auckland’s harbours has deteriorated because investment in storm water 
infrastructure has not kept pace with urban growth.  In other words, environmental capital 
has been drawn down as a substitute for manufactured capital.  The problem is of course 
not unique to Auckland, nor is it unique to coastal waterways.  For this reason, it is 
important for sustainable development that the values of environmental assets are known 
at the national, regional and local level. 
There is almost unanimous agreement that CAC regulation is an inadequate response to 
present environmental challenges.  Command-and-control instruments are myopic, 
provide inadequate incentives for innovation, carry higher costs than other approaches 
and are unlikely to be politically sustainable (Parson, 2000).  Markandya (1998) lists the 
following obstacles to implementing MBIs. 
Lack of knowledge.  The agency responsible for environmental policy must have the 
technical knowledge necessary to formulate and implement MBIs.  Polluters have the 
knowledge to respond appropriately.  Concerns of elected officials include the 
distributional implications of using MBIs; implications for output and employment in 
affected industries and communities; cost of implementation; and impact comparative 
advantage.   
Good governance.  The legal structure must define property rights adequately and 
establish authority to implement and enforce incentive systems. 
Competitive markets.  If firms are operating under soft budget constraints then they will 
not respond as effectively to fiscal incentives. 
Financial and administrative capacity.  The agency must have the capacity to initiate, 
monitor and enforce programs. 
Flexibility of response.  Private sector and individuals should have choice in their 
response.  





Market based instruments provide a basis for shaping sustainable development policy.  In 
Section 2 MBIs were shown to encompass key features of sustainable development viz.  
total economic value and intertemporal resource use.  In addition, the instruments can be 
designed to account for linkages within the environment.  Rather than arguing for 
universal application it was suggested that instrument selection should be based on 
rational analysis. 
This section established an institutional link between MBIs and sustainable development 
outcomes or indicators.  In the case of environmental externalities we know that 
information on willingness to pay and opportunity cost will not emerge from the market.  
Government intervention of some kind is necessary.  Market based instruments are 
included within a set of feasible external institutions – they are an object of choice. 
The simple dichotomy implied between strong sustainability (SS) and weak sustainability 
(WS) is of no particular use in institutional design.  For example, a legal framework 
mandating SS – eg, investment in renewable sources of energy should accompany the 
depletion of fossil fuels – would neglect relative scarcity and expectations summarised in 
market prices.  Investment in renewable sources of energy is likely to produce 
contemporaneous and intertemporal externalities too.  Similarly, rules requiring 
administrators to adopt rules such as the precautionary principle may encourage 
excessive conservation at the expense of growth and the welfare of future generations. 
Hierarchies of rules are important in institutional structures because they provide a basis 
for consistent governance.  For example, if tradable rights are implemented then external 
institutions must be established to provide a basis for protecting property rights, 
contracting and exchange.  This is essential for the predictable functioning of the 
economy over time. 
Hierarchies also provide a level at which externalities are resolved.  A simple net-benefit 
maximising model shows the location of control to hinge on the public good nature of the 
externality and the cost of information.  For example, policy initiatives dealing with global 
climate change and protection of endangered species is probably best dealt with at a 
national level.  In situations where spillovers are minimal then local decision-making is 
likely to be more efficient.  More weight is given to the argument in favour of local 
decision-making if we recognise information asymmetries in principal-agent relationships 
and the benefits of learning from variety at the local level of government.  Arguments in 
favour of more central control include situations where spillovers are significant, scale 
economies (eg, in research) might limit policy initiatives, increased transaction costs and a 
race for the bottom.  These are of course empirical issues. 
When the impacts of pollution are purely local, the costs of information not too great, and 
all relative preferences are reflected in local politics then the local incentives for 
environmental protection should be sufficient to achieve welfare maximising levels of 
protection without distorting prices.  Locally determined supply might not be optimal if 
powerful interest groups capture local government.  Combining central direction and local 
implementation may improve welfare. 
The environment is extreme in the extent that it is characterised by overlapping and 
shared authority.  Indeed it is highly probable that some aspect of the environment 
touches every unit of government in New Zealand.  Thus it is highly unlikely that we can 
match the primary scale of the problem with the primary scale of authority to manage the  




problem.  Decision-making is often simultaneously pulled out toward international 
management and inward to regional and local management. 
Obstacles limiting the use of MBIs will exist in the structure of external institutions.  The 
legal structure must define property rights adequately and establish clear lines of authority 
to implement and enforce MBIs.  Enhancing the coordinative power of institutions and 
providing a basis for sustainable economic growth is an important aspect of reform.  This 
is about getting the basic building blocks set in place.  Path dependency should be 
recognised.  If resources become increasingly scarce users will find ways to protect and 
enhance the value of their property rights within existing constraints.  Empirical studies 
show that environmental outcomes – water use, fish stock enhancement, water quality – 
can, in part, be linked to institutional structure.   
Policy aimed at introducing specific instruments – such as tradable rights – or providing 
for the evolution of community initiatives will require adjustments to external institutions.  
This is necessary but not sufficient.  We will see in Section 5 examples where the 
Resource Management Act provides for the use of economic instruments but 
administrators have consistently preferred regulation.  Thus incentives must exist for 
administrators to approach instrument choice within a rational framework that is consistent 
with the goals of sustainable development.  This topic is discussed in Section 4.  




4  Framework for assessment 
The design of environmental policy in a unitary government system is seen as involving 
two steps, setting policy goals and choosing the set of instruments to be used in achieving 
the goals (Braden and Proost 1997).  In contrast, it is argued, environmental policy in a 
federal system is more complex because it involves at least three dimensions: across 
levels of government (federal, state and local); across branches of government (executive, 
legislative, judicial) and across agencies at the same government level.  In reality, the 
design of environmental policy in New Zealand’s unitary system of government has some 
of the dimensions associated with a federal system: central, regional, local government; 
executive, legislative, judicial; across agencies at the level of central government.  While 
there are obvious differences to consider, for example New Zealand does not have a 
written constitution, insights gained from environmental policy in a federal system may 
provide insights for New Zealand. 
4.1 Environmental  governance 
The structure of governance is of interest because it carries with it implications for 
patterns of resource use and income distribution, both of which are relevant to sustainable 
development.  More significantly, environmental outcomes are co-determined by the 
policies, rules and mechanisms fashioned in the public sector to provide incentives for 
correcting externalities.  An economic analysis of environmental governance must account 
for many layers and the possibility of multiple objectives.  To simplify things we can 
describe a set of sustainable development indicators Q = { qe , qw , qa , …, qn } where qe = 
economic growth, qw = water quality, qa = air quality, and so on. 
The following aspects of governance are worthy of explicit consideration.   
4.1.1  Setting policy goals 
In contrast to a “one size fits all” approach to regulation, devolution to lower levels of 
government can result in greater efficiency because of the ability to weigh benefits and 
costs to be different from place to place.  For example, it might be appropriate for 
legislation to allow for different levels of water quality to be set across the country.  A 
national standard could be set as a “minima” (say, qw = minimum dissolved oxygen level) 
and lower levels of government would then target the minima plus any increase in the 
standard after explicitly assessing the costs and benefits of a higher standard. 
4.1.2 Bargaining  power 
Environmental outcomes (eg, air quality) often display the characteristics of a public good.  
In Section 2 we discussed the particular problems associated with public goods.  Through 
the political process interest groups can influence both the quantity and “price” of 
environmental outcomes.  Power concentrated at a national level places the regulator in 
the position of a monopolist.  This might prove advantageous in situations where 
bargaining involves large powerful commercial interests.  On the other hand, devolving 
decision making down to local units of government gives local interest groups relatively 
more focussed power because of reduced heterogeneity of preferences.  





Uncertainty spans not only scientific knowledge but also the outcomes of environmental 
policy.  Research leading to an improvement in the understanding of environmental 
processes might have the characteristics of a pure public good and may be best financed 
by the population as a whole.  In contrast, research leading to an improvement of an 
outcome that is shared by sectors within the community might be better financed by a 
differentiated contribution from the sectors involved, depending on the ability to monitor 
and measure those deriving benefit.  For example, this principle is used as a basis for 
cost-recovery in the fishing industry. 
In the presence of uncertainty, it may be appropriate to allow lower-level regulators to 
attempt different approaches to common problems.  For example, the outcome of 
alternative policy instruments for controlling non-point sources of water pollution is 
uncertain and there may be benefit from different units of local government 
“experimenting” with different approaches.  A higher-level government could set broad 
parameters that limit the scope of experimentation.  Of course, realisation of the benefits 
of experimentation is contingent on monitoring, measuring and sharing information on the 
outcomes associated with the various approaches. 
4.1.4 Transboundary  problems 
When external impacts spill over into neighbouring jurisdictions the rational unit of 
government will pay attention only to the local fraction.  This behaviour would result in too 
little environmental protection.  For example, consider a river flowing through two 
jurisdictions (A and B) and jurisdiction A has a concentration of pulp mills on the river.  
The mechanism adopted by jurisdiction A has obvious implications for the level of external 
damages visited on the community in jurisdiction B. 
4.1.5 Market  integration 
The potential for economies of scale and comparative advantage should be considered in 
the design of environmental governance.  It would be unrealistic for all coastal 
communities to equip themselves to cope with major oil spills.  Central government can 
most effectively design monitoring and reporting protocols.  Many local governments lack 
technical expertise to set, monitor and enforce standards.  Comparative advantage calls 
for different levels of government to specialise in different tasks. 
4.1.6 Ecological  dumping 
The pollution haven hypothesis suggests that polluters will move their activities to the 
most lenient jurisdiction (Markusen, Morey and Olewiler 1993).  A second hypothesis is 
that local units of government will compete for economic development by weakening their 
environmental standards.  However, these effects will be moderated by the cost of 
relocation, rapid diffusion of technology and increase in the demand for environmental 
protection.  The empirical evidence of pollution havens and ecological dumping is weak 
(Jaffe, Peterson and Portney, 1995).  




4.1.7 Fiscal  capacity 
Local government might be especially vulnerable to industry threats to relocate and or to 
free ride on service supply.  Segerson, Miceli and Wen (1997) show that central 
government will over-regulate if it does not pay any cost and local government will fail to 
minimise costs if it bears no financial exposure.  Thus there exists a threshold assignment 
of costs across levels of government. 
4.1.8 Policy  innovation 
Environmental policy design occurs under uncertainty about the consequences.  With 
central government policy, only one design can be implemented at once.  With devolution 
it would be possible to observe a number of policies attempting to address the same 
issue.  Of course the challenge is to encourage innovation while maintaining or improving 
environmental outcomes. 
4.2  Features of sustainable development 
The challenge that sustainable development poses for policy is somewhat different to 
many other policy problems.  In part, differences derive from the multifaceted nature of 
sustainable development and the emphasis given to the welfare of future generations.  
Policy that focuses on a single issue – say transportation – has impacts that flow into 
other domains of policy.  If we turn the problem around and consider externalities 
associated with transportation then instrument choice can potentially spill over into many 
units of government.  Thus a unit of government designed to deal with transport may not 
be adequately set up to deal with the externalities associated with transport.  Differences 
also follow from the emphasis given to sustainable development as a process of change 
in which exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of 
technological development and institutional change are made consistent with the future as 
well as present needs. 
Obviously, sustainable development policy should be based on institutions and decision-
making structures that lead to sustainable outcomes.  Clearly, it is not possible to design 
an optimal set of instruments if the end-state cannot be specified.  More importantly, it is 
imperative that policy choice be guided by economic efficiency.  If we dismiss economic 
efficiency as a criterion for policy analysis then we run the risk of stifling economic growth 
and compromising environmental quality.  In Section 2 we used the efficiency framework 
to analyse a range of policy instruments.  Where possible empirical evidence was used to 
establish their relative performance.  Table 2 summarises the key concepts of sustainable 
development.  




Table 2 - Key challenges of sustainable development 
Concepts   Elements 
Spatial scale  Global, national, regional 
Linkages  Ecological, organisational, policy 
Capital  Manufactured, natural, human, and social 
Value  Use values, non-use values, ecological measures 
Institutions  Structure, property rights, duties 
Participation  Preferences, consultation, democratic process 
Equity Intragenerational,  intergenerational 
Knowledge  Risk, uncertainty, technology 
Time Horizon,  discounting 
Source: Sharp, 2001 
4.3 Generic  framework 
Virtually every discussion on sustainability concludes that existing institutions are part of 
the problem and reform is required.  Section 2 provided evidence that traditional CAC 
approaches lead to unnecessary compliance costs that, in turn, result in lost economic 
welfare.  From the point of view of sustainable development this loss should be of concern 
because the current generation could achieve the same environmental outcome using 
fewer scarce resources thereby providing a greater endowment for future generations.  
Using economic instruments would free up these resources for alternative uses now or in 
the future. 
According to Dovers (2001), too often institutional and policy change does not flow from 
sound problem definition and consideration of alternative proposals.  He extends the 
“adaptive management” approach that was developed by ecologists to cope with 
complexities and uncertainties, to include institutions.  Five key principles for adaptive 
institutions are identified: 
Persistence: where efforts are maintained over time. 
Purposefulness: efforts are supported by stated principles and goals. 
Information richness and sensitivity: seek best information and make widely available. 
Inclusiveness: full range of stakeholders are involved in policy formulation and in 
management. 
Flexibility: prepared to experiment. 
Goodin (1996) proposes five desirable principles of institutional design: 
Revisability: learn through experience, and change trajectories and practices as required. 
Robustness: respond appropriately to more or less significant pressure. 
Sensitivity to motivational complexity: open to a variety of motivations and values. 
Publicity: publicly defensible and can gain political and community support. 
Variability: learning enhanced through encouraging experiments.  




It is not possible to specify an optimal institutional design.  At best we can check whether 
the attributes of institutional structure and decision-making are consistent with the general 
notions of sustainable development.  Table 3 links the attributes of institutions with the 
challenges of sustainable development shown in Table 2. 
Table 3 - Institutions for sustainable development 
Attribute To  enable 
Legal foundations  Setting sustainable development as a goal, expectation of longer time horizons, ability to 
experiment and adapt, ability to undertake comparative assessments. 
Locus of decision making  Incorporation of differences in economic and environmental conditions and community 
preferences. 
Fiscal capacity  Supply of adequate human capital, financial and information.  Economies of scale. 
Instruments  Decentralised decision-making, generation of information, incorporate community 
preferences, long term monitoring and evaluation. 
Incentives  Decision-making that economises on transaction costs, compliance costs are low, and 
results in sustainable outcomes. 
Integration  Synthesis and analysis of cross cutting (economic-environment) issues related to 
research, management and policy. 
Coordination  Linked with other institutions and processes, inter-jurisdictional (vertical and horizontal) 
coordination. 
Participatory  Participation that is appropriate to the context. 
4.3.1  Locus of decision-making 
The distinction between decentralisation and devolution should borne in mind when 
dealing with policy in New Zealand.  Decentralisation involves central government making 
decisions through branch offices.  Devolution involves transferring decision rights to 
regional/local government.  As Guerin (2002) notes the issue of subsidiarity is most 
obvious when dealing with the roles of the levels of government and the mechanisms for 
coordinating between and within levels.  Central government retains ultimate control and 
accountability.  The ability of local government to tax at all is dictated by parliament and 
can only be changed by parliament.  In the context of sustainable development policy in 
general and implementing MBIs in particular central government occupies the high ground 
– it delimits the rights and duties of lower levels of government. 
The allocation of rules and accountabilities between levels of government is determined 
not by constitution but by the processes of central government policy formulation.  Thus 
local government tends to operate, to some extent, as an agent of central government 
administering or interpreting the rules set centrally (Guerin, 2002).  For example, the 
Resource Management Act:  
•  prescribes procedures and criteria;  
•  leaves actual decisions at the regional/local level but provides for central government 
override; 
•  local government activities are divided into 3 categories 
−  prohibited, policy is set and implemented nationally, 
−  mandatory, policy set nationally and implemented locally, and 
−  discretionary, policy set and implemented locally.  




Transfer of functions between levels of government should be coupled with transfer of 
accountability.  Guerin (2002) offers the following principles for allocation and co-
ordination of functions: 
•  The allocation of powers must be addressed from both the private  (individual and 
firm) and public policy point of view.  As noted earlier, external institutions are 
important to achieving consistent regimes.  However, at the same time account 
should be taken of the diversity in preferences so that the jurisdiction of decision-
making is aligned with the jurisdiction of effects. 
•  Minimising of transaction costs. 
•  How the policy rules are set for different policy areas is more difficult.  For example, 
the public good nature of global climate change suggests centralised provision. 
•  Inter-and-intra government co-ordination can take the form of consultation, delegation 
or joint planning and/or implementation 
•  Accountability and participation across and between levels of government. 
•  The ability to “optimally” allocate responsibilities between levels of government 
requires clear criteria.  Kerr, Claridge and Milicich (1998) suggest the following: 
−  Where the relevant expertise and knowledge exists. 
−  Where effective accountability arrangements exist eg, close to those affected but 
avoiding small group domination. 
−  How best to make trade-offs between achieving the specific needs of one 
community group and delivering consistency between jurisdictions. 
−  Assuring that inter- and intra-national commitments are met. 
Bermann (1994) suggests that local governance is valued because it facilitates effective 
accountability of decision makers to those affected; allows self-determination and political 
liberty; has the flexibility to take account of local differences; and preserves identities and 
diversity. 
Guerin (2002) concludes by saying that the notion of subsidiarity provides a broad 
framework but does not provide the answer.  In the end, decisions should consider the 
availability of information; the location of costs and benefits of the decision; the 
accountability of decision-makers; and cost-efficiency. 
4.3.2 Incentives 
One way to analyse the issue of subsidiarity and devolution is to focus on the structure of 
governance, the rights and duties of actors at various nodes within the structure, and 
principal-agent relationships.  Tirole (1994) provides a useful overview of the application 
of incentive theory to public sector organisations.  He begins by discussing the differences 
between private and public sector organisations and is careful to point out that the 
differences are in degree and not fundamental in nature. 
Government may have a multiplicity of goals.  Typically the mandate of government 
agencies is multi-dimensional.  Although multi-dimensionality need not prevent the 
construction of powerful incentive schemes it does create difficulties.  First, some of the 
dimensions (eg, an indicator of sustainable development) might be hard to measure.  A 
second, and related, difficulty is the relative weights that attach to the multiple goals of the 
organisation.  For example, the RMA requires mitigation of adverse environmental  




impacts and instructs administrators to consider the costs and benefits of their policies.  
Setting an incentive scheme would require putting weights on these two measures. 
Many government agencies have a monopoly position that can make relative performance 
hard to measure.  At lower levels of government this may not be too difficult provided 
information is available.  For example, a study comparing the cost of consent processing 
across regional councils should be feasible. 
In contrast to a corporation, the goals of an agency are defined by a political process that 
changes over time reflecting heterogeneity of owners’ tastes.  Lack of time consistency 
may limit commitment possibilities relative to the public sector.  For example, bearing in 
mind the political cycle, what intertemporal commitments are possible if a lower level of 
government decides to deplete natural capital in expectation that future investment in 
manufactured capital will occur? Incentives for achieving sustainable development should 
be related to agency missions. 
Monetary incentives exist in government agencies.  However, incentives are likely to be 
low powered rather than formal incentives.  By low powered Tirole is suggesting that the 
agent receives only a small fraction of his or her marginal product.  To illustrate, a 
government official might lead a law reform that enables rights-based management of 
water resources that unleashes regional economic growth.  In the private sector this 
individual might enjoy a share bonus and other benefits.  Not so in the public sector.  
Existence of low-powered incentives is related to the difficulty of measuring marginal 
product and the existence of multiple objectives. 
An agency with a strong mission will give perfunctory attention to tasks that are not central 
to that mission.   If this observation is correct, then a directive to minimise adverse 
environmental effects without due consideration of compliance costs will bias resources 
toward activities that promote the former.   This of course raises the issue of where 
missions come from.  The example assumed that they are set externally or self-imposed.  
While we are in the realm of conjecture, we might also ask whether officials would accept 
the task of implementing MBIs knowing that they do not have the ability (broadly defined) 
to succeed. 
As mentioned earlier, adverse selection and moral hazard models have been applied to 
the issue of devolution.  When it comes to managing externalities and promoting 
sustainable development it is highly likely that we face the problem of incomplete 
contracting.  When all contingencies cannot be costlessly included in contracts the 
allocation of rights plays a role in deciding what to do in unforeseen circumstances.  It is 
more realistic to view government in terms of the distribution of control rights over various 
kinds of decisions (Tirole, 1994). 
Continuing with the idea of control rights we can consider these within the architecture of 
governance.  In New Zealand the architecture of governance is an external institution 
where control is determined by parliament.  Figure 13 provides a stylised view of two 
alternative architectures for sustainable development.  Sustainable development is shown 
as an overarching goal.  Numerous configurations are possible but let us look at the 
following two possibilities.  Sustainable development requires both vertical and horizontal 
coordination.  Alternative A shows central government ministries implementing MBIs that 
may or may not be differentiated across regions.  Alternative B shows the responsibility for 
introducing MBIs devolved to regional/local units of government.  Issues of efficient 
governance and incentives vis-à-vis achieving sustainable development can be assessed 
empirically within this architecture.  

















4.3.3 Strengthening  decision-making 
Meeting the challenge of sustainable development requires clear processes for identifying 
and integrating economic, social and environmental goals and efficiently implementing the 
goals at all levels of responsibility.  It was argued above that it is not possible to provide 
an optimisation plan for achieving the goals of sustainable development.  Policies are 
typically crosscutting where the particular issue will span the domain of several ministries 
and yet no one ministry is responsible for the policy in its entirety.  Section 5 uses air 
pollution to illustrate this problem.  Problems relating to the vertical dimension of policy 
need to be recognised also. 
Policy integration.  The Danish experience shows that it is easier to focus on the 
economic efficiency of environmental policies rather than to make economic policies more 
environmentally sensitive (OECD, 2001). 
Sectoral policy integration.  Institutional arrangements in many OECD countries tend to be 
organised along sectoral lines.  Specific policies as they relate to agriculture, transport 
and energy have the potential to spill-over into areas relevant to sustainable development. 
Policy integration between levels of government.  As noted earlier, devolution of decision-
making to lower units of government may result in more efficient and effective decision-
making.  The need for coherence between levels of government is particularly important 
when approaching national policy issues, such as climate change. 
Central Government 
Sustainable Development Policy 
Incentives flowing from MBIs and response by individuals, firms, organizations, 
groups, etc 
A  B 
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Indicators of sustainable development 




Strengthening the machinery of government.  Given the crosscutting nature of sustainable 
development there is a broader need for integrated policy advice and decisions.  
Government in the UK has committed itself to a sustainable development strategy that 
provides a framework for annual policy reviews against indicators (OECD, 2001).  
However, in order to operate effectively and efficiently, the machinery of government 
requires a consistent (and theoretically robust) definition of sustainable development in 
order to properly locate indicators for the purpose of informing policy makers Pearce and 
Barbier (2000).   
Accountability.  Ex post monitoring provides valuable feedback on progress towards goals 
and facilitates policy adjustments.  Accountability relies on good information, analysis and 
transparency in reporting results. 
Transparency and participation.  Consultation and participation are important because 
non-public entities are becoming increasingly involved in policy implementation.  
Transparency promotes trust – an internal institution - that underpins institutional stability.  
This was shown above to be particularly important when designing/modifying property 
rights. 
Although optimal institutional design, especially within the context of sustainable 
development, is beyond the reach of economic theory it is possible to list characteristics of 
good policy interventions: 
Policy should add value to the economy.  The primary test for all interventions (eg, MBIs, 
CAC) should be whether they could be expected to result in net benefits to the 
community. 
Policy should not be too prescriptive.  Policy instruments should lay foundations that 
recognise heterogeneity, provide scope for individuals to adjust according to their 
circumstances and flexible enough to incorporate dynamic adjustments. 
Policy should be performance based, implementation should be transparent and agencies 
accountable. 
Policy should be clear and concise. 
Policy should result in low compliance costs. 
Policy should be enforceable and offer low probability of regulatory capture. 
The following steps are suggested if reforms are necessary for the introduction of MBIs. 
A careful analysis of the impacts versus alternative methods of regulation should be 
carried out.  The affected parties should be identified and the relative merits of short term 
compensating measures examined.  Once a policy has been agreed on in broad terms it 
is important to improve public awareness and incorporate public input.  Legal instruments 
must be firmly in place for the instrument to be enacted and enforced. 
The agency should have adequate resources to carry out its functions.  All agency 
functions must be financed some how or other.  If a local agency is too small to finance an 
activity then cooperative arrangements could be used to make service supply feasible.  
Who should pay for service supply is a related issue.  In principle, those contributed to the 
“need” for service supply should finance the activity.  For example, commercial fishers 
contribute to the need for research and management – they pay an annual levy that 
covers a large percentage of research and management costs.  




4.3.4 Property  rights 
Property rights are a primary institution for facilitating economic growth and we should 
look for the following desirable characteristics: 
1.  Sustainability should be explicitly incorporated into mechanism design. 
2. The mechanism should unleash a dynamic that enables parties to exploit 
commercial opportunities for mutual gain. 
3.  Users should be confronted with the real (and dynamic) opportunity cost of use. 
4.  The allocation mechanism should have the flexibility to adapt to changes in the 
profile of opportunity costs over time. 
5.  The mechanism should make anticipation and strategic planning feasible for users. 
What tends to be neglected in most arguments for and against market-based reforms is 
the fact that all instruments generate effects.  The inescapable conclusion is that 
economic instruments provide a least-cost option for achieving an environmental target 
because they provide flexibility in the firm’s response, whether through investment, 
changing input mixes, changing production, and so on.  Furthermore, transparency tends 
to be greater with market-based instruments relative to the less-visible costs associated 
with regulations. 
The adverse effects of reform can be reduced in a number of ways. 
International coordination can assist reform.  Governments, particularly trading partners, 
can participate, share experiences and discuss possible coordination. 
Unilateral implementation of market-based instruments could be coupled with social 
welfare to reduce the burden on those affected.   
Time phased implementation can help firms adjust.  A credible timetable may allow firms 
to make short-run adjustments in anticipation of implementation 
Public acceptance of the instrument can be enhanced by better use of revenues 
generated and re-cycling revenue to particular sectors.    
Regulatory reform can lower compliance costs and increase economic efficiency.  
However attention must be paid to the net effect of reform.  In other words, regulatory 
reform should be a value enhancing exercise.  Regulatory reform may lower the economic 
cost of existing regulations and may increase the effectiveness of market-based 
instruments by increasing competition in related markets.  However if prices – eg, water, 
energy – do not fully capture opportunity costs then regulatory reform may increase 
demand and associated emissions.  Furthermore, the relative price of substitute sources 
may increase, lowering their appeal to consumers. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The challenge that sustainable development poses for policy is somewhat different to 
many other policy problems.  Governance is important to achieving the outcomes of 
sustainable development because it provides both structure and incentives.  Section 3 
provided a framework for linking institutions with spatial and intertemporal patterns of 
resource use, economic growth, and the maintenance of natural capital.  Virtually every  




discussion on sustainability concludes that existing institutions are part of the problem and 
reform is required. 
Meeting the challenge of sustainable development requires clear processes for identifying 
and integrating economic and environmental goals and efficiently implementing the goals 
at all levels of responsibility.  This is consistent with the focus that sustainable 
development has on intertemporal welfare.  It was argued above that it is not possible to 
provide an optimisation plan for achieving the goals of sustainable development.  Policies 
are typically crosscutting where the particular issue will span the domain of several 
ministries and yet no one ministry is responsible for sustainable development. 
Deciding whether to locate specific instrument choice at central or regional/local levels is 
an empirical issue.  In some situations central control might be appropriate, in other cases 
control might be better located at the local level.  In general, unless the externality is truly 
national (eg, global climate change) then a “one size fits all” is highly unlikely to be 
consistent with the principles of sustainable development.  Efficiency gains can accrue 
from devolution that enables instrument choice to explicitly take into account 
heterogeneity in community preferences and ecosystems.  In some situations, there may 
be benefits in having regulatory power concentrated at the central level of government 
when there are powerful commercial interests.  On the other hand, devolving decision 
making down to local units of government gives local interest groups relatively more 
focussed power because of reduced heterogeneity of preferences.  In the presence of 
uncertainty, it may be appropriate to allow lower-level regulators to attempt different 
approaches to common problems.  A higher-level government could set broad parameters 
that limit the scope of experimentation.  The potential for economies of scale and 
comparative advantage should be considered in the design of environmental governance.  
Comparative advantage calls for different levels of government to specialise in different 
tasks. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard should be considered when assessing the relative 
merits of devolution.  When it comes to managing externalities and promoting sustainable 
development we cannot assume complete contracts.  In part, this is because the current 
government is not typically bound by the decisions of earlier government.  It also arises 
because of myopia and the likelihood of temporally inconsistent patterns of resource use.  
In this situation the allocation of rights - vertically and horizontally - within the architecture 
of governance is probably a more realistic view of government. 
Thus, the issue is who has the rights – if at all - to implement MBIs.  Sustainable 
development is characterised by crosscutting issues – the economy-environment linkage 
is obvious.  This of course raises the issue of policy integration and coordination.  
Coordination horizontally and vertically degrades incentive intensity and adds to 
bureaucratic costs.  One case study in Section 5 will highlight this difficulty. 
Incentives for achieving sustainable development should be related to agency missions.  
As noted in my earlier report, sustainable development policy may have multiple goals 
that may make it difficult to appropriately incentivise administrators (Sharp, 2001).  
Difficulties with measuring the productivity of agents may result in low powered incentives 
to efficiently achieve sustainable development outcomes.   
Optimal institutional design, especially within the context of sustainable development, is 
beyond the reach of economic theory.  As a rough guideline, policy should add value to 
the economy, policy should not be too prescriptive and policy instruments should lay 
foundations that recognise heterogeneity, provide scope for individuals to adjust  




according to their circumstances and flexible enough to incorporate dynamic adjustments.  
Policy should be performance based, implementation transparent and agencies 
accountable.  Policy should be clear, concise, enforceable, offer low probability of 
regulatory capture and result in low compliance costs.  




5  Applications to New Zealand 
In this section we look for evidence of MBIs being used in New Zealand.  Discussions 
were held with the Auckland Regional Council, Environment Canterbury, and the Otago 
Regional Council.  The issues facing each Council are different.  The Councils also differ 
in terms of the expertise and resources available to them.  Although coverage is limited 
the cases do point to fundamental problems with governance if indeed sustainable 
development is a goal.   
5.1 Policy  integration 
If government wants to promote sustainable development then it is imperative that policy 
is integrated at the central level of government.  A very cursory look at the listed functions 
of two ministries finds evidence of activities that directly relate to sustainable 
development.  Because of the cross cutting nature of sustainable development it will span 
a number of government agencies.  For example, setting fuel specifications would touch 
on The Treasury, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of 
Health and Ministry for the Environment. 
Sustainable development appears as an outcome in the Ministry of Economic 
Development’s (MED) statement of intent.  It recognises the importance of the micro-
economic foundations for growth and the Ministry’s prime role is to ensure that these 
foundations evolve to facilitate economic development.  Economic policies are seen to 
contribute both to a higher rate of economic development and to sustainable social and 
environmental outcomes.  Two intermediate outcomes underpin the over-arching 
outcome.  The first is that regulation of economic activity is effective and low cost and the 
second that regional development, business growth and innovation are actively facilitated 
and encouraged. 
The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) reports on the state of the New Zealand 
environment and the way that environmental laws and policies work in practice, and 
advises Government on action necessary to improve environmental management.  
Significant areas of policy are resource management; land, air and water quality; waste, 
hazardous substances and contaminated sites; protection of the ozone layer; and climate 
change.  The Ministry notes that most of the responsibility for day-to-day environmental 
management rests with local government, particularly the regional councils and that an 
integrated approach to environmental management provides a sound framework for 
developing policy and providing advice.  The Ministry also offers advice on the 
environmental implications of other Government policies, such as Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements; and contributes to interdepartmental work on biological diversity, marine 
environmental issues, energy and transport.  The Ministry consults with local government, 
resource users, resource managers, and others likely to be affected by changes in policy 
or legislation, and provides information and advice to assist them. 
Clearly these two ministries are responsible for policy advice as it relates to sustainable 
development.  Both offer advice on national policy issues such as climate change.  
Interestingly, the MfE reports  on the state of the environment and advises government on 
action necessary to improve environmental management.  The MED is quite explicit in its 
mission regarding the compliance costs of regulation.  Who should lower levels of 
government, or business, approach when seeking action? The increased need for  




horizontal co-ordination reduces incentive intensity at this level of governance and adds to 
co-ordination costs.  The cost to lower units of government will increase with the number 
of supra units of government that need to be convinced that (national-level) intervention is 
necessary to achieve sustainable development.  The emergence of units in central 
government ministries undertaking environmental analysis is reminiscent of the “green 
dots” that reforms in the 1980s sought to amalgamate. 
5.2  Achieving clarity of purpose 
Skelton and Memon (2002) provide a review of section 5 of the RMA and reflect on the 
experience of adopting and applying the concept of sustainability as the basis for an 
environmental statute designed to help resolve conflicts over allocation and resource 
management.  Although section 5 uses “sustainable management” the definition 
encapsulates in their minds the concept of SD as laid out in the Brundtland report (WCED, 
1974).  During the policy development phase of the Act, the biophysical perspective – 
“environmental bottom line” was promoted by government and officials.  One of the 
difficulties associated with section 5 is that practitioners and elected councillors have 
taken a view that differs from that accepted by the courts.  Even if parliament thought it 
was moving away from an anthropocentric view to prescribing environmental bottom lines, 
this was not to be.  The courts have taken the view of an “over all judgement” approach.  
Judgements “… allow for a comparison of conflicting considerations in the scale or degree 
of them, and their relative significance or proportion in the final outcome.” (Skelton and 
Memon, 2002:8).  This suggests a weight be given to the various elements of sustainable 
management in the context of a particular case.   Furthermore, Skelton and Memon 
(2002) suggest that it is inappropriate to single out in advance any particular elements of 
the meaning of sustainable management and give it some kind of primacy over others.  
Thus it puts the onus on decision-makers to take into account the diverse values that 
groups place on the environment as a basis for decision-making.   
The above analysis has implications for sustainable development.  First, the notion of 
environmental bottom lines approximates an operational meaning of strong sustainability.  
It would appear that the courts are interpreting the statute as requiring an overall 
judgement to be made.  This suggests trade-offs – spatial and intertemporal – and 
provides an opportunity for the use of total economic value within the decision-making 
process.  Furthermore, the above interpretation suggests an anthropocentric as opposed 
to ecocentric approach to value.  The Courts’ interpretation of section 5 of the RMA does 
not prevent the implementation of MBIs.  In recognising the need for a balance the Courts’ 
have provided an outer-envelope for the use of MBIs.  However, we will see that the 
potential to use MBIs is severely limited.   
5.3  Market based instruments 
There is no doubt that there is significant scope to use MBIs to underpin sustainable 
development.  Furthermore, there is ample evidence that MBIs can offer the same 
environmental outcome at lower cost.  We now briefly turn to an examination of current 
practice.  Once again coverage is limited, the aim is to highlight outcomes under 
contemporary decision-making structures rather than present definitive results.  We have 
seen in the MfE’s statement that a great deal of the responsibility of environmental 
management rests with regional councils.  




5.3.1 Legal  framework 
As McGee (1994) points out, polluter pays charges may only be imposed under the 
authority of an Act of Parliament.  This of course limits the methods and level of 
government at which pollution taxes can be applied.  Options for the use of polluter pays 
charges are further limited by the powers central government confers on lower levels of 
government (Bullen, Jacobsen, Palmer and Scrimgeour 2000).  Therefore policies to 
promote sustainable development must fit within the legal framework prescribed by central 
government, acting outside the legal framework is ultra vires.  Lower levels of government 
cannot apply polluter pays charges as an instrument of environmental policy if there is no 
parliamentary authority. 
In the context of instrument choice it is important to recognise that local government has 
only the powers authorised in legislation.  As Bullen et al (2000) note, local government is 
a creature of central government.  Thus the relevant statutes viz Resource Management 
Act and Local Government Act limit the decision-making structures of regional/local 
government  vis-à-vis sustainable development.  Section 24 of the RMA requires the 
Minister for the Environment to consider the use of economic instruments to achieve the 
purposes of the Act.  At the regional/local level, section 32 requires administrators when 
adopting any objective, policy, rule or method in relation to administration of the Act to 
have regard to alternatives including the provision of information, services or incentives 
and the levying of charges (including rates).  This particular section is cast within the 
context of an assessment of viz an evaluation – appropriate to the circumstances - of the 
likely benefits and costs of each alternative.  It would appear that the RMA provides a 
basis for using MBIs and indeed asks administrators to assess the relative merits of 
alternative instruments, including CAC and MBIs.  Let us look at common approaches to 
water allocation and air pollution
4
. 
5.3.2 Water  consumption 
Section 136 of the RMA makes provision for the transfer of water permits, to take and use 
water (eg, irrigation) which may in some circumstances be transferred to another firm or 
another site provided both sites are in the same catchment.  Tradable water rights are 
feasible.  Water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource in Canterbury and Otago.  
Economic development in both regions is being fuelled by water using industry viz.  
dairying, horticulture and other intensive farming systems. 
Both regional councils allocate water on a first-come first served basis according to the 
requirements of land use.  River flows and aquifer levels are often modelled and use 
monitored.  Total abstraction levels are limited by minimum flows in rivers or water levels 
in aquifers.  Restrictions are imposed during shortages.  Typically, transfers are not 
feasible beyond transferring the permit to a new owner of the enterprise.  During water 
restrictions there is limited scope for transfer.  Permit duration is adequate for investment.  
Water use is not measured.  Farmers are suspicious of measuring water use because 
they see it as a precursor to charging. 
Although water allocation in both Canterbury and Otago makes allowances for “in-stream 
uses” administrators have not used the total economic value framework.  Whether the 
balance referred to by Skelton and Memon (2002) is being achieved will be an ongoing 
debate.  In parts of Canterbury and Otago the allocation of water between productive uses 
                                                                 
4 I have drawn extensively on the report prepared by Bullen et al (2000) prepared for the Auckland Regional Council and a legal 
opinion provided to Environment Canterbury.    




and in-stream uses is being contested in the Environment Court.  There can be little doubt 
that water is valuable in production – but administrators do not know the relative value and 
there is no mechanism (other than land acquisition) that guides water to its most 
productive use.  The inefficiencies of CAC highlighted in Section 2 apply.  Furthermore, if 
water is not being used efficiently then there might be a greater risk of adverse 
environmental impacts in the future.  The contest for water – not only between productive 
users and environmental groups but also within the community of productive users - can 
be expected to increase over time. 
The operative water allocation plan for the Oroua Catchment (Manawatu-Wanganui 
Regional Council) established a basis for the first tradable permit system in New Zealand 
(Sharp, 1996).  Ten year permits were granted according to existing entitlements within 
constraints of the plan.  New users had to obtain all or part of their requirements from 
existing irrigators.  Although permits are transferable the right to transfer is attenuated.  
The whole or part of an interest in a water permit may be transferred during periods of 
water restriction only, provided the end use is irrigation, both sites are within the 
catchment and the Council is informed in advance of the transfer.   
Figure 14 scores the Manawatu-Wanganui tradable rights scheme using the dimensions 
provided in Section 3.  Duration scores highly, exclusivity lower because the users 
entitlement can be reduced, both transferability and transformability are attenuated and 
score relatively low.  The area of the “star” suggests the value attaching to the right.  The 
value of these rights would exceed the value of rights in an identical catchment where 
water is allocated using CAC.  















5.3.3 Air  pollution 
Controlling discharges to air is unambiguously assigned to regional councils.  To an 
economist at least, the intent of section 32 is that regional councils should use a cost-
benefit framework to consider alternative instruments.  The total cost of the health effects 
of motor vehicle air pollution in New Zealand has been estimated to be around $700 m per 
annum (Fisher, 2000). 
Site specific discharge permits regulate point sources of air pollution.  Section 137 of the 
Act prohibits the transfer of a discharge permit or the interest in such a permit, except 
where the transfer is to the owner or occupier of the site.  If a firm has a permit to 
discharge into the atmosphere and the firm is sold then the permit accompanies the firm.  
Legislation prevents the permit from moving independently of the firm.  In contrast to 
setting minimum water flows and water quality standards, there is no mechanism for 
setting minimum air quality levels or maximum air pollution loadings. 
There is no provision in legislation for setting quotas, allocating quotas or requiring firms 
to participate in a tradable permit scheme.  Indeed there is a total absence of an allocation 
mechanism other than a requirement that councils process applications on a first-come 
first served basis.  According to Bullen at al (2000) there is no legal authority for regional 
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Development of New Zealand’s fisheries over the period 1963-83 occurred within an 
institutional framework that encouraged growth.  By the end of this period economic rent 
in the fishery was low and important commercial stocks were depleted – that is, 
development was unsustainable (Sharp, 1997).  In 1986 a quota management system 
(QMS) based on transferable rights, operating within the constraints of sustainability, was 
implemented.  As noted in Section 2, the QMS is structured around individual transferable 
quota rights and a total allowable catch.  The former institution provides the basis for 
allocating rights across commercial interests.  The latter institution is based on scientific 
information and stakeholder consultation (Batstone and Sharp, 1999).   The QMS easily 
out-performs its predecessor. 













Positive rents and sustainable harvest are distinguishing features of New Zealand’s 
fishing industry.  Figure 15 shows the size of the “star” reflecting the quality of rights.  In 
contrast to water use in irrigation, we know that economic rents are positive (the market 
value for ITQ > 0) and this information can be incorporated into the Ministry of Fisheries’ 
stock adjustment process.  Fishers know the cost of harvest and they will form 
expectations in the market over stock abundance, market conditions, and so on.  Thus 
managers have some additional information to base the allowable catch 
recommendations on.  Furthermore, the Ministry can examine the impact of regulations in 
terms of value (Batstone and Sharp, forthcoming).  It was pointed out in Section 2 that 
commercial fishers pay a significant share of the costs of management and research.  
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The RMA uses the term “economic instruments” and asks administrators to undertake an 
evaluation – appropriate to the case - of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of 
action.  However the Act is silent on whether regional councils are authorised to use 
economic instruments (Bullen et al 2000).  More significantly, the Act precludes the use of 
tradable instruments in point sources of air and water pollution.  Two regional councils 
have seriously looked at MBIs as a possible solution to air pollution only to be thwarted by 
infeasibility in law. 
In the case of water allocation, tradable permits are feasible, yet only one regional council 
has implemented a scheme.  Adoption of tradable permits in the Oroua Catchment was 
prompted by submissions (from the Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of 
Agriculture) to hearings on the water plan.  Water use in some areas is not even 
monitored.  Users view monitoring as a precursor to charging and strongly oppose its use.  
This state of affairs stands in stark contrast to successful tradable rights system 
underpinning commercial fisheries in New Zealand. 
What differences might have led to this outcome? First, fisheries policy has always been 
the function of a central unit of government.  In contrast, since 1991 water resource 
management has been the primary responsibility of regional government.  Thus we could 
follow the path dependency line of argument and conclude that reforms are somehow 
linked to the status quo.  Second, we might look for reasons in the technical complexity of 
fisheries management vis-à-vis water resource management.  Given that water resource 
managers must base their allocations on scientific information the issue is really one of 
relative cost.  On the surface, the science of water hydrology would not appear to be any 
more complex than fisheries science.  Third, the bio-economic state of New Zealand’s 
fisheries prior to reform required action.  It might be that the state of water management 
has not reached a similar point.  Maybe the looming contest between abstractive users 
and other non-abstractive interests will lead to market based instruments.  Time will tell.  
Ownership is not an obvious issue – fish in situ are not owned, what is owned is a right to 
harvest.  The same can easily apply to water.  Finally, reluctance to embrace MBIs might 
be traceable back to pre-RMA days and the prevailing regulatory culture in regional 
government.  Even the Section 32 requirement to assess the costs and benefits of 
alternative approaches is not sufficient to incentivise serious consideration of MBIs. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The above examples highlight shortcomings in the current institutional structure.  First, the 
environment court has imposed its interpretation of the overarching aims of the RMA.  Its 
interpretation is now at variance with the political view at the time.  The contemporary view 
is one of “balance”, as opposed to securing “environmental bottom lines”.  More 
significantly the courts interpretation of requiring an overall judgement sits well alongside 
the key concepts of sustainable development.  This may not be a surprise because 
language of the RMA is remarkably similar to the Brundland definition. 
One of the most striking observations has to do with MBIs.  The use of MBIs is severely 
constrained by legislation and by the CAC culture that exists in regional government.  For 
all intents and purposes MBIs are not feasible for controlling environmental externalities – 
viz pollution.  Where scope does exist for their use – eg, water allocation - administrators 
invariably shy away from their application.  Command and control is the favoured 
instrument and BAT is often selected without economic analysis.  Administrators are not  




able to report on the cost of compliance.  In short, we currently have no idea of the true 
costs and benefits of policies related to sustainable development.  




6  Conclusions and recommendations 
6.1 Conclusions 
Correcting externalities and pricing access to natural resources both occupy centre stage 
in sustainable development.  Externalities and excess resource depletion are rooted in 
market failure.  The economics literature on externalities and the merits of MBIs relative to 
CAC is well understood.  Empirical evidence shows CAC to exceed least cost alternatives.  
In terms of sustainable development, regulation can be expected to result in excessive 
resource use in the present that might work to reduce the welfare of future generations.  
The weight of evidence shows MBIs to score relatively highly in terms of sustainable 
development.   
As a criterion, economic efficiency can be applied to both the spatial and temporal 
aspects of sustainable development.  In principle, the economic model can incorporate the 
latest scientific knowledge on ecosystems the notion of total economic value.  Market 
based instruments  are consistent with sustainable development.  The choice of a market-
based instrument should be based on analysis of the particular externality, while the 
choice between taxes and quotas as instruments of sustainable development control 
should be sensitive to the nature of the uncertainties involved.   
Public policy should be based on the rational use of market incentives.  This is particularly 
true in the context of sustainable development.  In New Zealand today the potential for 
economic analysis to contribute to environmental policy is great and yet to be fully 
realised.   
Historically, central and local governments have relied primarily on regulations to meet 
their environmental goals.  From the outset we must note that both CAC and polluter pays 
require a standard.  Governments usually set standards after considering scientific 
evidence and stakeholder preferences.  Thus the issue for sustainable development is 
using a policy instrument that achieves the standard at least-cost.  To do otherwise 
unnecessarily increases expenditures in the present.  Regulations that impose a 
technology on industry will not adequately account for the heterogeneity of firms nor will 
the technology adopted necessarily be cost minimising.  Regulation will not produce the 
desired outcome at least-cost.  Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. 
Polluter pays provides an opportunity cost to the polluter that acts as an on-going 
incentive to implement less costly abatement technology.  Defining tradable rights to the 
standard provides similar incentives.  Economic instruments produce a richer response on 
both sides of the market.  There is no blueprint or algorithm to follow when considering 
whether to regulate or turn to market-based instruments.  Good economic reasons might 
exist for adopting regulations.  Devolving rights to communities, empowering them to 
“manage” the local resource, providing technical (and possibly financial) assistance, is a 
powerful instrument.  There are good working examples of how devolution to non-
government organisations produced significant environmental gains. 
Market based instruments score relatively highly in terms of sustainable development.  
Concepts such as total economic value and concern for future generations can be directly 
addressed and incorporated.  Within the generic set of options laid out above, there exists 
a huge range of potential applications.  Discovering the most appropriate instrument  




should result from careful economic analysis.  Ill-conceived proposals to use of MBIs will 
not gain the acceptance needed for implementation. 
In New Zealand today the potential for economic analysis to contribute to environmental 
policy is great and yet to be fully realised.  At a more general level, current practice of not 
pricing access to scarce environmental resources will, eventually compromise sustainable 
development.  Reliance on regulation offers a political advantage in that its impact on 
producers and consumers is mostly implicit.   
Often there are difficulties to overcome with economic instruments.  For example, there 
might be powerful income effects to deal with that work against the political acceptability 
of economic instruments.   Lack of practical understanding of the instruments can limit 
application.  Too often they are crudely modelled and fail to take into account important 
transition steps.  While it is important to get the principles right, it is also important to get 
the transition sorted. 
A simple net-benefit maximising model shows the location of control to hinge on the public 
good nature of the externality and the cost of information.  In situations where spillovers 
are minimal then local decision-making is likely to be more efficient.  More weight is given 
to the argument in favour of local decision-making if we recognise information 
asymmetries in principal-agent relationships and the benefits of learning from variety at 
the local level of government.  Arguments in favour of more central control include 
situations where spillovers are important, scale economies (eg, in research) might limit 
policy initiatives, there is increased transaction costs and a race for the bottom.  These 
are of course empirical issues. 
The structure of governance is important to sustainable development because it works to 
determine spatial and intertemporal patterns of resource use, economic growth and the 
maintenance of natural capital.  Virtually every discussion on sustainability concludes that 
existing institutions are part of the problem and reform is required. 
Devolving rights to communities, empowering them to “manage” the local resource, 
providing technical (and possibly financial) assistance, is a powerful instrument.  There 
are good working examples of how devolution to non-government organisations produced 
significant environmental gains. 
However, MBIs must be legally feasible if they are to become an object of choice.  
Furthermore, administrators should be appropriately incentivised to adopt policies that are 
conducive to economic growth within the context of sustainable development.   
Enhancing the coordinative power of units of government – horizontally and vertically - is 
necessary for achieving sustainable development.  This is about getting the basic building 
blocks set in place.  Sustainable development outcomes are inextricably linked to decision 
making structures and procedures.  Path dependency should be recognised.  If resources 
become increasingly scarce users will find ways to protect and enhance the value of their 
property rights within existing constraints.  Empirical studies show that environmental 
outcomes – water use, stock enhancement, water quality – can, in part, be linked to 
institutional structure. 
It is important to seriously consider the allocation of rights - vertically and horizontally - 
within the architecture of governance.  The issue is who has the rights – if at all - to 
implement MBIs.  Incentives for achieving sustainable development should be clearly 
related to agency missions.  As noted in my earlier report, sustainable development policy 
may have multiple goals that may make it difficult to appropriately incentivise  




administrators.  Difficulties with measuring the productivity of agents may result in low 
powered incentives to efficiently achieve sustainable development outcomes.   
Implementing sustainable development policy will require a transparent linkage between 
indicators and policy delivery mechanisms.  Policies are typically crosscutting and a 
particular issue will usually span the domain of several ministries. 
Optimal institutional design, especially within the context of sustainable development, is 
beyond the reach of economic theory.  As a rough guideline, policy should add value to 
the economy and society, policy should not be too prescriptive and policy instruments 
should lay foundations that recognise heterogeneity, provide scope for individuals to 
adjust according to their circumstances and flexible enough to incorporate dynamic 
adjustments.  Policy should be performance based, implementation transparent and 
agencies accountable.  Policy should be clear and concise.  Policy should result in low 
compliance costs.  Policy should be enforceable and offer low probability of regulatory 
capture. 
Several shortcomings of existing institutional and decision-making structures were 
highlighted.  First, it is clear that the political intent of section 5 of the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) has not endured and we have witnessed the Environment Court 
developing its own interpretation.  The Courts’ interpretation sits well alongside the key 
concepts of sustainable development.  This may not be a surprise because language of 
the RMA is remarkably similar to the Brundtland definition.  Second, the use of MBIs is 
severely constrained by legislation.  For all intents and purposes they are not feasible.  
Third, where scope does exist for using MBIs administrators invariably shy away from 
their application.  Command and control is the favoured instrument and BAT is often 
selected without economic analysis.  In short, we have no idea of the costs and benefits of 
policies related to sustainable development. 
Setting aside legal infeasibility, administrator preference for CAC might stem from three 
sources.  First, interest groups might be able to exert influence on policy and mechanism 
design.  Second, it might be argued that lower levels of government do not have the 
scientific knowledge necessary for using MBIs.  Third, lower levels of government may not 
have the expertise to analyse and propose operational alternatives to CAC.  If this 
characterisation is correct, then the last two problems can quite easily be addressed.  We 
must recognise that CAC requires scientific knowledge therefore the issue has to do with 
the additional cost of knowledge and human capital necessary for implementing MBIs.  
Regulatory capture – if it exists - may prove more difficult to control.  For example, 
legislation could be made more prescriptive or the locus of decisions could be raised to 
central government.  Whether this makes economic sense is an empirical issue because 
of the costs and benefits involved with each alternative. 
The environment is extreme in the extent that it is characterised by overlapping and 
shared authority.  Indeed it is highly probable that some aspect of the environment 
touches every unit of government in New Zealand.  Thus it is highly unlikely that we can 
match the primary scale of the problem with the primary scale of authority to manage the 
problem.  Decision-making is often simultaneously pulled out toward international 
management and inward to regional and local management. 
Meeting the challenge of sustainable development requires clear processes for identifying 
and integrating economic and environmental goals and efficiently implementing the goals 
at all levels of responsibility.  Implementing sustainable development policy will require a 
transparent linkage between indicators and policy delivery mechanisms.  It was argued  




above that it is not possible to provide an optimisation plan for achieving the goals of 
sustainable development.  Policies are typically cross-cutting where the particular issue 
will span the domain of several ministries and yet no one ministry is responsible for the 
policy  
6.2  Recommendations for future research 
This report builds on earlier work that focussed on developing an integrated framework for 
sustainable development.  The set of instruments available to policy makers is relatively 
well understood.  A brief survey of contemporary practice reveals that either the 
application of MBIs is infeasible in law, or in cases where it is feasible, administrators are 
reluctant to implement MBIs.  The former can be corrected by law reform if government 
considers this necessary to achieving sustainable outcomes.  Important externality 
problems can be addressed by law reform viz.  the Resource Management Act.    
However, while reform may be necessary it is unlikely to be sufficient.  This report 
illustrated situations where the use of MBIs is feasible yet administrators are reluctant to 
implement them. 
There appears to be a significant skill gap vis-à-vis economic instruments at lower levels 
of government.  Short courses and education programs might effectively plug this gap. 
Part of the reason why CAC endures may well be the fact that we simply don’t know how 
much CAC costs the economy.   Empirical estimates of these costs might prove useful to 
policy makers who can highlight the real cost of CAC.  This can be achieved in two ways.  
Primary data could be gathered from a sample of firms to estimate compliance costs.   
There may be an existing database – for example, the Annual Business Enterprise Survey 
run by Statistics NZ  – that could give an indication of  compliance costs. 
A second area of future work relates to sustainable development indicators.  This was 
suggested in my first report.  Internationally, there is some debate about whether to use 
micro-level or macro-level indicators.  This topic could be further explored with the view of 
providing indicators for ex post assessment of progress and ex ante indicators for policy 
analysis.  
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